Last word

Epilogue

There was a police strike in February 1972 in Larkana, Z.A. Bhutto’s home town. The policemen had gone on strike and protested in front of Bhutto himself against the abusive attitude of the local PPP leadership and workers when he had gone their for shikar (recreational hunting). Mian An­war Ali, Director, Intelligence Bureau, told me that the President wanted somebody reliable from Rawalpindi to go and look deeply into the matter. Mian Sahib believed that I could do the job to the President’s satisfaction.
I reached Larkana the next day. Yousaf Orakzai, IGP Sindh, was there that day. Noor Elahi Laghari had been posted as the new SP of the district and had taken over the same day.
I gathered views of most of the relevant policemen. They stated that they had voted for PPP and were as loyal to Bhutto as anybody else. But they were upset because they were getting threats of dismissal for allegedly having collaborated with Yahya Khan. Normally policemen would not have both­ered about such threats but now PPP was in power and the threats could eas­ily lead to action.
Basically it was a crisis of confidence as there could be hardly any col­laboration of a poor constable or a sub-inspector with the previous regime. Therefore, I recommended in my report that the confidence of the force must be restored immediately.
The strike was also a protest against other simmering causes. I found that the police, particularly the Police Lines reserves, were resentful of their working conditions, low pay, long working hours and generally the raw deal they got. I forewarned that similar incidents could happen at other places also. To others, the striking policemen of Larkana would look like distant heroes. Therefore, basic measures needed to be taken immediately by the senior police command and the Government.
The Larkana strike was called off but a similar one took place in Dadu and then in Hyderabad. I went there also and gave my comprehensive report to Mian Anwar Ali. He discussed the report with Bhutto but no positive steps were taken. Instead, the approach adopted was authoritarian, not saga­cious or realistic. Later, Mian Sahib would ask me half jokingly almost daily, “How are the Distant Heroes?”

As necessary measures were not taken in Sindh, the strikes soon spread to the NWFP and then to the Punjab. The problem had recurred with all its fury. However, instead of facing the realities, Bhutto looked for more sinis­ter reasons for the mischief. He would like to see the hands of Russia, India, NAP and others behind it and wanted to “nip the evil in the bud with full force.” DIB, civil servants, senior police officers and even generals advised him against the use of force but he was adamant. He even went to the extent of ordering Gen. Gul Hasan, the army chief, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the air force chief, to bombard the Peshawar Police Lines by artillery and air respectively. They requested him to review his orders in view of its serious implications. They delayed action on the pretext of planning and reconnais­sance, which Bhutto interpreted as defiance and disobedience.
In the meantime, persuasion as well as threats from the senior police command had made the striking policemen to agree to call off the strike. In the Punjab Sahibzada Raoof Ali, DIG Rawalpindi, and other senior popular police officers worked very hard behind the scene. They assured the police­men that no harm would come to them. Once the atmosphere became con­ducive, a deadline to call off the strike was given by Governor Mustafa Khar. The strategy worked. Mustafa Khar addressed a large public meeting in La­hore and warned the striking policemen that severe action would be taken against them if they did not report for duty. The police strike ended with a whimper, providing a great boost to the PPP, Khar and Bhutto.

The police mutiny in India. The trouble was not confined to Pakistan. In May 1973, the police constabulary in the Uttar Pradesh state of India rose against the Government and even came eyeball-to-eyeball with the army. It was an event of great concern to police authorities all over South Asia. Due to similarity of organization and service conditions, the virus could spread and it could happen somewhere else also. Sahibzada Raoof Ali, who was by then IGP, Punjab, was, therefore, very keen that the mutiny should be studied and the factors behind it be analyzed. The study should also point out the lessons to be learnt.
A/Hameed was the most suitable person for such work. He had also ac­companied me on my request to Larkana for the inquiry into the police strike there. Therefore, I requested him to undertake the project. He came to Rawalpindi from Lahore and stayed with me for several months.
The first problem he faced was the lack of necessary raw material. The reporting of the mutiny in the national press had been very sketchy. Even the British papers, which usually give considerable coverage to South Asian af­fairs because of the nostalgia for the British raj in this region, had not done much better. There were also no other studies of similar kind as no police officer or administrator had ever ventured into such a field.
A/Hameed believed that the needed material on the events and various aspects of the mutiny would be available only in the Indian newspapers. So, I arranged to get all leading English dailies not only for the period covering the events but also of several weeks afterwards during which comments and analytical reports on the mutiny might have appeared.
The total was about 500 copies. It was a huge stack to discourage any ordinary soul but A/Hameed was undaunted. In fact, he was glad that now he would be able to make his study really comprehensive. Day after day and from morning to night, he continued to scan the newspapers very methodi­cally. He would not move from his seat at all nor take any break except for meals. One casualty of his sedentary work was a sofa of the SSP House that got a deep depression under his weight.
After about two months of continuous daily work, he collected the basic raw material and started the process of selecting, categorizing and condens­ing it. Then came the writing. So much cut-and-paste, typing, retyping and proof-reading was involved that A/Hameed regrets to this day that no com­puter was then available to him to take the physical drudgery out of the job. (Well, the first personal computer in the world became commercially avail­able two years after his project was over! He is always ahead of time.)
The research itself was not easy. For example, not a single newspaper had given more than a few words or a single sentence about the leader of the mutiny. A/Hameed collected all these bits and pieces to prepare a profile of Ram Badoria, a head constable with an M.A. degree. The extraordinary man was so devoted to his colleagues that he refused promotion to become an As­sistant Sub Inspector in order to avoid losing his membership of the police­men association.
The result of A/Hameed’s hard labour was a very useful 87-page report, covering all aspects of the event. (A copy can be obtained from Danishkada, the publisher of this book.) As the conditions in India and Pakistan were similar, the report became very relevant for us. Sahibzada Raoof Ali read the report with great interest and praised it profusely in a meeting of his staff of­ficers. He also arranged for the distribution of copies among other police of­ficers. A/Hameed used to joke that if a copy of his report found its way across the border, the Indians would be very impressed and would be giving credit to our agencies for doing “excellent intelligence work!”

The report confirmed my findings of the Larkana report but with much more substance and evidence. Poor working conditions, long hours of duty, lack of accommodation, inadequate transport, low salaries, over-education and, most important, disregard for their self-respect, were the major causes besides many other factors.

Behaviour with public. I never forgot the lessons of inquiries into po­lice strikes. One was regarding the police behaviour with the public. After taking over as SSP, Lahore, I found that one of the basic problems was the rude attitude of the police. Everybody, including labour, students, journalists and ordinary citizens, was unhappy with the rough attitude and foul language of policemen. On the other hand, the policemen were convinced that they were following the right path and only to do their job effectively.
I talked to them candidly and frankly. Many of them would not buy my recipe of politeness and firmness based on law and justice. They came up with the argument that most people in power had been using foul language and strong arm tactics for effective administration, like Ghulam Muhammad as Governor General, Yahya Khan as President and Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh as Governor. “Why anybody should object to us alone?” they asked. “We behave better than most of the rulers.”
Higher educational standards for policemen are often discussed in our society but without proper analysis and perspective. A myth prevails that highly-educated constables will automatically improve their behaviour but it is not always true. Education must be correlated to the nature of job and the adequacy of remuneration. Otherwise, it will cause distortions in the organi­zation and problems for the individual policeman. If a graduate is given the guard duty, he will consider his education unutilized, even wasted. A frus­trated man is more peevish and is likely to misbehave. The police reforms should be a comprehensive package, covering all aspects. This was one of the lessons I learnt from A/Hameed’s study.

Not a drop to drink. I requested A/Hameed to list as an outsider the reasons for the rough behaviour of the policemen. I studied his list and looked into the causes analytically, in the light of my own experience and in­side information. The picture that emerged was really very dismal.
The abysmal living conditions were a major cause of rough behaviour. The constabulary in Lahore had no place to live. The population of the city had grown more than 15 times and the manpower also had been increased (though certainly not proportionally) but without making any increase in their already very meager accommodation, both married and unmarried. (The married accommodation was for less than 2% of the police strength and most of it was in a dilapidated condition, having been built during the 19th cen­tury.) Even many of the buildings for offices, police stations and police posts were either dilapidated or did not exist at all. New residential and industrial colonies had come up but there was no provision for police buildings.
The District Police Lines, where thousands of policemen reside, had no drinking water as the tubewell had been out of order for the last ten years. (To survive, they were stealing drinking water from the pipes of the Lahore Municipal Corporation and a nearby mosque.) Gulberg, Ichhra, Samanabad, Model Town and other posh areas had no buildings for police stations or po­lice posts. The transport and communications were in a miserable condition. There were no funds to pay phone bills or gas bills; no funds for the repairs of the few official vehicles, not even for the repairs of the arms. The police­men had not been trained at all as there were no training facilities or even time for training. The more I looked into the miserable situation, the more I became discouraged and demoralized. The task was really daunting.
The rot was the result of neglect over a very long period. The succes­sive governments never provided the required finances. The police had been kept on the hook all the time for upholding unpopular governments but the senior police command and the governments never looked into the internal problems of the policemen themselves. The rulers and senior administrators were always demanding that agitators must be kept away so that they could enjoy their powers without any disturbance. They paid no heed even to crime as criminals did not disturb their personal peace. The criminals were a prob­lem of the ordinary people, not of the elite who, in any case, had police guards to protect them and their residences.

Natural allies. When the policeman was left to fend for himself, his natural and willing ally would be the criminal and the law-breaker. So the neglected policeman slided towards the criminals and opted to live by misus­ing his legal authority to his own advantage. The authority is a sacred trust from Allah but the policemen followed in the footsteps of the rulers, who were proud of violating even the basic laws of the land. The fatigued and famished policemen, without home or hearth, living away from the civilizing influence of their families, dehumanized and brutalized by the use of naked force for illegitimate and criminal rulers, were prone to colluding with crimi­nals, especially the organized ones, and taking it out on the poor citizens. No wonder they were rude and crude, rough and tough.
It was a very agonizing analysis that A/Hameed and I made by observa­tions on the spot and from his research on the police mutiny in India. How could I alone successfully draw them nearer to people against such heavy odds? However, fortified by my faith in the goodness of human nature, I took it on myself as a mission to bring the policemen closer to the law-abid­ing citizens.

Taking officers out of the rut. Beside meetings and addresses on the benefits of service to humanity, I used to take my officers out of the normal police environment and initiated exchange of views on subjects like poetry, music and art. Once I took them to the Lahore Shahi Fort for the “Light and Sound” show, which depicted the history of the fort. The imperial dialogues, the classical music and the varying effects of light and sound had a visible impact. Next I arranged a mushaira (poetry recitation by poets themselves) of the police officers. This created a very healthy atmosphere and, in the process, the latent talent of many officers was discovered and recognized. I took them for working picnics to Kamran’s Baradari (in midstream of the Ravi river), Shalamar Gardens, Changa Manga Forest Park, Balloki canal headworks and other recreational spots around Lahore. I organized regular regimental activities, like kabaddi, volleyball and basketball matches and other sports, variety shows, folk music contests, etc. The most thrilling items turned out to be tug-of-war and gulli danda.
Gradually, I could see the officers coming out of their shells. By taking them out of their daily routine for some time, I was helping them to relax their minds and become receptive to human values. A few relaxing and re­freshing moments during the daily drudgery started to remove the fatigue ef­fects of years.
It was an encouraging beginning in my efforts to turn the tide. I tried to re-educate the policemen by various means to respect the rule of law and mo­rality. The executive and judiciary also helped, displaying a commendable team spirit. The very enthusiastic response from the people from all walks of life took us a long way in our crusade against crime. They joined the war in every possible way and even sacrificed their lives along with the spirited po­licemen in encounters with criminals.
The inspiration worked wonders in many cases when the policemen no longer feared even death in fighting criminals. Like a battle for army sol­diers, an encounter with criminals is a test of bravery for policemen. A de­moralized force avoids a face-to-face fight as far as possible. After all, fighting means a real possibility of injury, even death. No wonder, the an­nual number of encounters of the Punjab policemen with criminals had been mostly in two digits (16 in 1986, 28 in 1987, 68 in 1988, 60 in 1989 and 167 in 1990). In 1991, however, the figures jumped to 119 in the first six months alone. The figures for 1992 and 1993 (six months) were also very high. (More details in a table in the chapter, “Some facts and figures.”)

The moving spirit stemmed the rot to some extent but it could not make up for the massive efforts, money and time that were needed to bring about a visible change. The crime situation was still very grim, much worse than I have been able to describe. In fact, what we see is not even the tip of the ice­berg, only the surface of the moral and social decay that gives a frightening view when we look closely.
Why? Because we have defied the wisdom of centuries and accepted might as right. The moral and legal values been ridiculed while their viola­tion was tolerated, justified, even glorified. As a result, the whole structure of the society began to collapse, giving way to crime syndicates and mafias.
It is shocking to hear highly educated people in high positions say that the police alone is responsible for controlling crime. The police, no doubt, has the vital role of arresting the accused and collecting evidence against them but its role is very limited in the wider perspective. The real authority and responsibility for punishing criminals lies with the courts of justice. Un­fortunately, the rulers and the administrators have also relegated the role of the courts into the background and the criminal justice system was al­lowed to decay.

The police is in a very deplorable condition. More than half of the po­lice stations in the Punjab have no buildings. Some are even in tents! The barrack accommodation in the police lines is for no more than 15% of the force. Some seek shelters in mosques. (Nobody tries to find out where the rest go to sleep for the night.) The accommodation for married personnel is only for less than 3%. (Where do the 97% keep their families?) The arms for fighting criminals consisted mostly of .303 Enfield rifles from the early part of the century. The transport, if available at all, is rickety and worn out. The communication network is patchy, with Morse code telegraph still being used at places. There are so many other problems and all need resources.
The situation is made much worse by very frequent transfers of Station House Officers (SHOs). According to an official study, in July 1991 there were just 37 out of 556 (or 6%) SHOs in the Punjab who had been serving at their police stations for more than a year. The average tenure was less than six months for 29% and less than even three months for 44% of SHOs! What efficiency can be expected of them if they don’t have time even to know the staff under them, not to speak of the area under their jurisdiction?

Not even peanuts for peace. Where are those who talk all the time of “strong action” and “the use of an iron hand” when the budgets are prepared and the police is denied even absolutely essential funds? The “iron hand” has been rusting and wearing out due to prolonged neglect and lack of planning and is no longer able to take even “weak action.” The vociferous pronouncements and promises are never followed up by action to meet even the basic needs of crime fighting.
The criminal justice has never been a priority of any government since Inde­pendence. It suffered even more after it was classified as “non-development ex­penditure.” The babus of bureaucracy never realized that no development was possible unless there was peace in the society. The misguided governments, trying to impress the people with grandiose projects, forgot that their first duty was to protect the life, property and honour of their citizens and provide them justice. Good government means peace and justice. The development will follow if the people have the will to improve their lot.
The misguided rulers brought material development at the cost of social order. They even reduced funds. The Punjab Police budget in 1947 was 11% of the total government budget and that too was on a reduced scale be­cause of the post-war economy. By early 1990s, the police budget had come down to less than 5% of the provincial budget. In fact that too was an in­crease. At one stage in 1970s, the ratio had even fallen below 3%.
It should not have surprised anyone if the police performance continued to deteriorate. Fighting spirit and dedication do help but are not enough. Therefore, to rebuild the shattered police and to meet the increasing policing needs of the society, I prepared a comprehensive five-year plan. The whole package would not have cost more than two billion rupees per year and yet, in five years, not only the neglect of the past decades would have been met but some modernization would also have been possible. Considering other government expenditures, the price of peace would have been peanuts.

There were a series of meetings, both at provincial and federal levels, to consider the demand for more funds. The Prime Minister and the Chief Minister both were very keen that the capability of the police must increase. But their controllers of finance, who get sadistic pleasure in rejecting even very genuine requests for funds, did not want to “waste money on the callous and ruthless police.” I could not let their presumptuousness go unchallenged.
“Yes, you have a point,” I said in one such meeting with them in Is­lamabad. “Then why not wind up the entire police department? Why do you blame the police alone? Everyone of us is callous. You too are no paragons of virtue. All you are doing in your airconditioned offices is basically only an accountant’s job. And yet you condemn the policeman, who fights the criminals at the risk of his life. He displays more dedication to duty despite severe hardships and miseries. Still he is better behaved than even some of your best. The gallant policeman faces bullets every day so that the myopic babus like you could sleep in peace.” I was really furious but my strong words did have some effects. Instead of total refusal, I got a paltry sum of Rs 250 million for 1991-92 and that too as a one-time grant. This is how the whims of its babus of bureaucracy work in utter disregard for the basic needs of the society.
I was painfully conscious that the innumerable sacrifices of the police­men had stemmed the rot but then the government became oblivious of its responsibilities. If the policemen had not been doing their job so well, the frightening and sensational crimes would have been going on. The robbers and dacoits would have looted some of the bureaucrats also. Then there would have been a panic and money would have been given to the police merely on asking instead of fuming and fretting over its very essential de­mands.
After that meeting, I suffered a bout of agony, worst in my whole ca­reer. The moment I was alone in my rest-house room, I cried for the valiant officers and men, who had given their lives in such a large number for the peace of the society. I felt that I had failed them. They were and are great people and only Allah can reward them. They walk into the jaws of death on the orders of their commanders. The ordinary people did show the highest regard for the shaheeds, built monuments in their honour and looked after their children and families.

Something that money can’t buy. The governments have to recon­sider their priorities. When their allocation for the external defence can be the second biggest item of expenditure in the federal budget, and that too not subject to audit, why can’t they spend equal to just one or two percent of it extra for the internal defence of the country? The war for internal security goes on every single day and night of the year and policemen are being killed and injured. No defence comes free, external or internal. If the representa­tives of the society can sleep peacefully at night, it is not because they have provided for the internal security as adequately as they have done for the bor­ders. Nobody grudges the expenditure on external defence, specially when we are faced with an enemy like India. But the internal defence can be strengthened and brought up to the desired standards by providing only a tiny fraction of what is squandered annually on “development.”
If the present rot continues, the society should dread the day when it will have to face the inevitable consequences. The policeman is no longer an illit­erate or semi-literate villager, who suffered hardships and gross neglect be­cause he had no better alternative at home. Now even constables are required to be educated, at least up to secondary school (matriculation), and many have higher education. They are acutely aware of what others are getting elsewhere in government and in private sector with equivalent or even less qualifications. (A bank’s guard, for example, is far better off than a consta­ble, with a fraction of his daily duties.) Why should they continue to tolerate subhuman conditions?
The society should dread the day when the policemen decide to change their lot. It is the only organized force that has legal powers to arrest and prosecute. If the policemen rebel and decide to use their powers for their own benefit, the present level of corruption and persecution in the police will pale into insignificance.
The day of reckoning will certainly come. But by then a colossal cost would have been paid through loss of life and property. Will the society continue to be oblivious of its responsibilities till then? The people who de­mand the police to attain the European and American standards should also compare the budgets and the working conditions. They are not grateful that our crime is still far less. If money is too precious to be wasted on the police, wait for the day when you will be holding bags full of money and there would be no takers to provide peace and order. You cannot simply buy solu­tions to basic problems whenever you wish. Internal security is not like a pill for a headache.