32

Nawaz Sharif on center stage
“What will be the outcome of the coming elections?” Nawaz Sharif asked me at the oath-taking ceremony of the new Governor and the caretaker Chief Minister at the Governor House in Lahore on August 6, 1990, the day Benazir government was dismissed. Though I no longer had the benefit of the Special Branch re­sources, I could safely predict, on the basis of my pre­vious experience, that the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) would get over 90 National Assembly seats from the Punjab. He felt happy but termed it “too op­timistic” as Haji Akram’s forecast was for over 70 seats. I ex­plained that my assessment was based on one COP candidate contesting against one PPP candidate. (Ch. Muhammad Arshad, as he told me, had con­vinced Jatoi and others that the PPP had little chance if one-to-one for­mula was adopted.)
“If one-to-one formula had been adopted by the anti-PPP parties in 1970, there would have been a clear defeat to PPP even then,” I told Mian Sahib. “The chances of PPP are defi­nitely dimmer now after 20 months of misrule and corruption.”
Pir Pagara did not agree with my assessment when I met him at his resi­dence. According to him, the one-to-one formula was not going to work nor had it ever worked in the past. He had been heading many parliamentary boards and had ob­served that the distribution of tickets caused problems even within in­dividual political parties, not to talk of a large alliance like COP. I told him that Arshad Chaudhri had done a good job, basing his exercise on the data of 1985 and 1988 election results and the surveys of the Special Branch, Punjab that he had consulted at the Chief Minister House. In earlier elections, such useful and well-arranged data was not available. The exercise for selecting candidates, as far as IJI par­ties were concerned, had already been carried out in 1988. The re­maining parties did not pose much problem as far as Punjab was con­cerned, with Nawabzada Nasrulla being the only prominent person from the Punjab to be adjusted. The other provinces had clear-cut political alignments and choosing COP candidates, who were likely to win, was not difficult.
After hearing my explanation, Pir Pa­gara thought that it could be done if parties did not ask for quotas on party basis and accepted the winning candidate in a par­ticular constituency, irrespective of his party within COP. I talked to him again after a few days. He was absolutely certain that the COP could get a landslide victory if tickets were given only to the candidates who were likely to win in their constituencies.
Nawaz Sharif and Arshad Chaudhri pursued the idea and convinced the lead­ers of other parties in COP. The meeting of the COP for selecting candi­dates, held under the chairmanship of Mustafa Jatoi, decided the awarding of 170 tickets without any problem. The remaining 20 were decided the next day, also on one-to-one basis. The very few seats that caused some problems were left open without any bad blood. It was a very intelligent beginning for the COP.
The PPP, on the other hand, went for alliance with very insignifi­cant parties, including Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and Tehrik Nifaz-i-Fiqa-i-Ja’faria. Then the name of the alliance, Pakistan Democratic Alliance, was totally unknown and had a serious identity problem. PPP made a grave tactical blunder by abandoning its own name, which was very well-known and also had an emo­tional attachment for its voters. The party was carrying other burdens too. The cases of corruption and maladministration during its recent rule were widely known. There were references for disqualification against Benazir and her associates in superior courts, initiated by President Ghulam Ishaq. The estab­lishment was also tilted against the ousted party.
In that perspective, it was but easy to make a safe guess about the suc­cess of the COP, especially when I had the advantage of my expe­rience of the Special Branch and tits realistic data. My forecast of 90 National As­sembly seats was too optimistic for most politicians, administrators and intel­lectuals but there was no doubt in my mind.
Two days after the dismissal of the Benazir government, Malik Meraj Khalid, Sardar Farooq Leghari and Khwaja Tariq Rahim met me. They wanted to challenge the President’s proclamation in the courts and were very hopeful of their success. They asked me to per­suade Nawaz Sharif to join them in going to the courts for the judicial revival of the assemblies.
“How can I take your proposal to Nawaz Sharif when the two cases are of different nature,” I told them. “The Punjab Assembly was dissolved on his own advice as Chief Minister while the National As­sembly had been dis­solved by the President.”
“We will do something about that also,” said Kh. Tariq Rahim, Bar at Law, without explaining what it could be.
“Well, I cannot give him bad advice,” I said firmly. “Mian Sa­hib also is shrewd enough to understand the implications. I think the best will be to ensure that elections do take place on October 24. There will be many people and forces trying to spread fears and phobias on all sides. You will have to defeat them.”
They did not like my candid views. They were living in a make-believe world and wanted to come back into power without having to face elections. It appeared that they also lacked comprehension of ground realities.

Attempt to bring in martial law. Siraj Munir, who had joined the staff of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the caretaker Prime Minister, was spending most of his time in the Holiday Inn (now Marriott Hotel) in Islamabad. I went to see him there and found a computer and some staff in his room. It could be official staff and equipment but did not turn out to be so. Aziz Qureshi was also staying in the same hotel, in another room. Haji Qadar Gul, the former MNA from FATA, too was around. After some time Khwaja Khairuddin also ar­rived, although he was living in the Prime Minister House. Ostensibly, the group was meeting its own expenses but somebody must be backing them. I could not find out who.
All of them were my friends. They were all convinced that the country would be destroyed if elections were held. They firmly be­lieved that PPP was going to win again and this time would destroy the army with venge­ance. They strongly felt that the country had always been harmed by elec­tions and was even split because of the elections in 1970. I disputed their as­sessments strongly but was intrigued why the group was trying to subvert the electoral process by raising baseless fears.
Khwaja Khairuddin said, “You are the only one who thinks COP can win. I see a repetition of 1954 when Juktu Front won in East Pakistan. I had predicted that but Kamal Azfar’s father, who was the Chief Secretary, did not agree with me. You bureaucrats are all the same. We need a strong and sta­ble government to save the country. Civilian governments are always shaky and weak. Only army can save us.” The others endorsed him enthusiasti­cally. I was shocked. The harrowing scenes of 1971 in East Pakistan and of 1983-84 in Sindh haunted me.
I bluntly asked them, “Do you want martial law?”
“That is the only way out,” said Siraj Munir.
I reminded them of the situation in 1971 and 1983-84 and said emphati­cally, “Thank God, Zia-ul-Haq gave us the elections in 1985 and the country was saved. It is not elections but refusal to hold elec­tions that harms the country. It is the non-acceptance of results that harms the country. For God’s sake, have the heart and face elections. I can assure you that PPP will not win. Even if it does, it will be better to let it rule than to have martial law.”
They were unmoved. Perhaps their motivation was too strong for my words to change their minds. Siraj finally said, “It is not the ques­tion of PPP or COP. All civilians are the same and the country is not safe with them.”
I mentioned the group’s activities to Arshad Chaudhri. He said this “election roko cell” seemed to be working to block the elections. After a few days, I managed to get a copy of the computer printout of a well-argued position pa­per, prepared by the group to justify the imposition of martial law. I showed the paper to Arshad Chaudhri, Haji Akram, and then gave it to Anwar Zahid, Chief Secretary, Punjab. The conspiracy to block the elections was exposed suc­cessfully by Arshad Chaudhri through the media.

Converting the doomsayers. Towards the last week of September, I got a phone call from Gen. (Retd) Rifaquat, who was not much ac­quainted with me. He told me that Altaf Hasan Qureshee and Zahid Malik were also with him. He asked me about the out­come of the elections. He did not be­lieve me when I gave him my forecast in brief. However, he told me, he was impressed by what he had heard of my un­derstanding of elections. Altaf Qureshee had informed him about my assessments for the coming elections and how true my forecasts had been in 1988. He invited me to come over to Islamabad for a discus­sion.
Gen. Rifaquat, Altaf Hasan Qureshee, Zahid Malik and I went over the list of contestants from the Punjab, analyzing every constitu­ency. I had the data on which I had based my assessments, with break-ups of the voters in every constituency. After our prolonged discussion, the General was con­vinced that COP would certainly get at least 74 National As­sembly seats in the Punjab but did not agree on my figure of 90. All as­sessments given to him until then by various agencies had painted a very dismal picture, as he told me. He talked to Fazal-ur-Rahman, Secre­tary to the President, on the green phone (hot line intercom) and in­formed him about my assessments and that he himself was now convinced that COP would get at least 74 NA seats from the Punjab. He desired that President might be informed.
Later, he took me to Flashman’s Hotel in Rawalpindi so that I could explain the reasons and grounds for my assessment to a number of prominent journalists, including Z.A. Suleri, Mujib Shami, Mustafa Sadiq, Inquilab Matri and Muhammad Salahuddin. They wanted a quick briefing but I said I would not give them vague and generalized guesses. Instead, I would pro­ceed constituency by con­stituency, with facts and figures, and leave the conclusions to them. It was a prolonged session. Some of them did not be­lieve what I was saying and preferred to have a nap. Most of them, however, did get convinced when I gave them full details.
Inquilab Matri said, “You are saying all this with an air of cer­tainty.”
“Yes, because I took great pains to study the data and the relevant fac­tors,” I replied.
The next day I was called to the Presidency. Brig. Ajaib, Military Secre­tary to the President, along with Ch. Shaukat Ali, Secretary, Election Commission, had a long session with me to analyze the prob­lem constituen­cies in the Punjab. I told them that there were no prob­lem constituencies, except one in Jhang, where Begum Abida Husain was contesting. Ch. Shau­kat had a pessimistic view. He had hunches but little specific information or data. He doubted even Nawaz Sharif’s own constituency. I told them that nothing could be farther from truth. Anyhow, they listed a few such con­stituen­cies in the Punjab, though unnecessarily in my view. I told them that the polarization at the level of the ordinary people was so intense that there was no need to worry about any of those constituencies. The people would vote only for one of the two sides and the independents or turncoats of either party would have little chance.
One such constitu­ency in their view was that of Ijaz-ul-Haq, who had entered politics after the death of his father, President Zia-ul-Haq. They were worried about the negative voting for the third candidate, Riaz Husain Shah, who had se­cured about 35,000 votes in 1988, and tried to persuade him to with­draw. In my view, it was unnecessary, as Riaz Husain would get very few votes because of the polarization this time. (He did not withdraw and se­cured less than 3000 votes!) Contrary to the fears of Ch. Shaukat Ali, Nawaz Sharif won from all his constituencies with big margins. Be­gum Abida Husain lost, in spite of favourable reports.
I, along with Haji Akram, had a long session with Ijlal Haider Zaidi, who was also monitoring the elections. I had not worked with him earlier but found him extremely intelligent and brilliant, with an excellent understanding of the political scenario. After three days of discussions, he was fully con­vinced of the accuracy of my assessments. In fact, he relied so much on my views that I was not allowed to go back to Lahore until the polling on October 24.
Most of the important people in the chambers of power had convinced themselves before the dismissal of Assemblies that the PPP was dead and gone. But it no longer appeared to be so in view of the reports that they were getting of large crowds at PPP meetings and pro­cessions. Now they were nervous and doubtful about the outcome. It was shocking how the big bu­reaucrats were totally out of touch with reality and how little affinity they had with the people. They lived in a make-believe world and yet arrogated to themselves the right to decide for the people. Our friends in “the election roko cell” in the Holiday Inn were also driving them paranoid. More than any­body else, it was Ijlal Haider Zaidi, who gave others the needed courage to face the elections.
Altaf Qureshee later told me how I was brought into the world of doom­say­ers. He had met President Ghulam Ishaq and Gen. Aslam Beg and found both of them extremely worried about the outcome of the elections. When he found the situation very gloomy, he suggested that I should be consulted as, ac­cording to him, I had a more correct and positive picture. “That is how you were called in,” he disclosed. I was happy that I was able to give them enough courage to remain on the political track. I removed their unfounded fears to a large extent. Other­wise, I shudder to think what they would have done in desperation. Who knows, the friends in the Holiday Inn might well have succeeded in having their way.

“Carry them all with you.” The results of the elections proved that my assessment was quite accurate. In fact, the COP got a few seats more than my forecast figure of 90 for the Punjab! The in­fluence of the admini­stration and the government worked in favour of the COP but there was no objectionable manipulation or any kind of rigging. The magic was in the one-to-one formula.
On the election day, Nawaz Sharif met me at the Lahore airport at mid­day on his way to Faisalabad along with Haji Akram. He again asked for my assessment. It was the same. I was cool and calculating like any profes­sional. And he still had his doubts. It was natural be­cause he had too many stakes.

As results poured in during the night, Nawaz Sharif was carried away by the landslide victory of COP. While talking to somebody on phone, he said that the Muslim League alone could form the govern­ment, without the support of any other party. Haji Akram inter­vened immediately to correct him. “Every party of IJI and COP has contributed to success,” he said. “You must not say anything that might upset the alliance. You have to carry them all with you if you want to be a successful Prime Minister and a na­tional leader.” He got the point but it was distressing how his mind was working. Later on, some of his short-sighted friends, particularly non-politi­cal elements, did alienate him from his allies and ultimately caused his down­fall.
I had told Roedad Khan, Ijlal Zaidi and Gen. Rifaquat that the results would not be accepted by the losing side. “First, it is a long tradition in our country that defeat in elections is never accepted gracefully,” I pointed out. “Sec­ondly, the press has failed to accurately reflect the public mood, mak­ing the results very unexpected.” I suggested that the COP should cele­brate the victory in a big way. How would the people perceive the reality of their verdict unless it was also made manifest through celebration?
Haji Akram suggested the same to Nawaz Sharif in the late eve­ning of the election day. Mian Sahib decided to go to the Badshahi Mosque for thanksgiving prayers. He was advised against open cele­bration by Brig. Im­tiaz and some other timid bureaucrats, who feared trouble. They had little political sense. The lapse was exploited by the adversaries slowly and stead­ily, casting doubts on the transparency of the elections, even leading to a change in the course of history. If there had been widespread public expres­sion of victory, the events might not have taken an ugly turn in 1993.
The “transparent elections” of 1993 were, in fact, the positive reaf­firmation of the 1990 elections. If the COP had been intact and had used the one-to-one seat formula in 1993, there would have been a re­peat perform­ance of 1990. My assessments of 1987, 1988 and 1990 were vindicated by the results of 1993 elections.
After the massive mandate for COP, especially from the Punjab, it was but natural that Nawaz Sharif should become the Prime Minister. The care­taker Prime Minister Mustafa Jatoi, who had also been elected from Sindh as well as Sialkot, proposed the name of Mian Sahib in the National Assembly while the former Prime Minister and the President of the Muslim League, Muhammad Khan Junejo, seconded the pro­posal. It was a great day that a popular Punjabi politician was elected with an overwhelming majority of the house and wide support from all over the country. The political process had healed the wounds in less than seven years. In 1983, Jatoi’s mother, for the first time in her life, led a procession that was shouting, “Punjabi fauj mur­dabad” (Down with Punjabi army) and now Jatoi was proposing the name of a Punjabi for the highest political office. And it was being endorsed by an­other former Sindhi Prime Minister. I had always believed that the political face of the Punjab would be more pleasing and attractive than its stern mili­tary one. We would have escaped the humiliation of 1971 also if we had a political face even then.