30

The road to 1988 elections
After the initial convulsions and setbacks, including the after-effects of Zia’s death, the country was soon in the grip of an election fever. Nawaz Sharif addressed a series of large public meetings throughout the country, at­tracting responsive crowds. He organized a steering committee, consisting of senior Muslim Leaguers of all prov­inces, including the Chief Ministers. He also formed a represen­tative committee of top party leaders for selecting candidates who could win mainly by their personal influence. It included leaders like Mian Ab­dul Sattar Laleka, Malik Naeem, Siddique Kanju, Malik Saleem Iqbal and Ghulam Haider Wyne.
The Chief Minister Secretariat asked for the copies of the studies and surveys that had been carried out by the Special Branch for the local bodies elections and then linked to the National and Provincial Assembly constitu­encies in the Punjab. The copies were then passed on to Asif Vardag and Sattar La­leka. The two worked round the clock and were always ready with their proposals for the approval of Mian Sahib whenever he re­turned from his whirlwind tours. Nawaz Sharif was lucky to have such bril­liant brains available to him.
The two-man committee proposed panels of candidates for every Na­tional Assembly constituency in the Punjab along with a pair of candidates for the corresponding Provincial Assembly seats. (Every National As­sembly constituency covers approximately the areas of two Provincial Assembly seats.) Working very patiently, Asif Vardag pored over the analysis reports and surveys to propose panels of candidates. Sattar Laleka, on the other hand, had so much personal knowledge of the local and regional politics and politicians that he independently evolved his own pan­els. The panels pre­pared by the two had the same names in 95% of the cases! When I came to know about Laleka’s vast and deep political knowledge, I called him “a liv­ing encyclopedia of politics.”
To look after the publicity matters, Nawaz Sharif formed a committee, consisting of celebrated professionals like Siraj Munir, Husain Haqqani and Mujib-ur-Rahman Shami. I met Siraj Munir in the Chief Minister House for the first time. I was enamoured by his sharp intellect and depth of knowl­edge. He carried himself with great dignity and grace and spoke with pene­trating wit and wisdom. (He died in late 1990 at the age of 38. “So wise so young, they say, do never live long,” says Shakespeare in Richard III.)
Husain Haqqani was brilliant, dynamic and a great writer of invaluable worth. Mujib Shami was an acclaimed writer, an experienced journalist and the owner-editor of Zindagi weekly and Qaumi Digest monthly, both in Urdu. The leader of the team was Al­taf Hasan Qureshee, the mature maes­tro of great intellect and wisdom, with a measured pace born out of the con­fidence given by a rich expe­rience of life, journalism and a deep sense of history. (He is the chief editor of Urdu Digest monthly and the General Sec­retary of the Pakis­tan Institute of National Affairs.) Somewhere in the background of the formidable committee was Dr Safdar Mahmood, the great historian with all his intellect and brilliance. Nawaz Sharif was his student in the Government College, Lahore.
The untiring efforts and efficiency of the publicity committee took the wind out of the sails of the PPP. Siraj Munir told me that the thrust of their campaign was to remind the people of the high-handed­ness and tyranny of the earlier PPP government in the 1970s under Z.A. Bhutto. (The negative projection of the earlier period, I told Siraj Mu­nir, might not help as the in­tervening martial law period had sur­passed the PPP government in tyranny. He did not like my remarks as he was a great fan of Gen. Zia.)
They also projected the decent and benevolent style of Nawaz Sharif. It seemed that they had captured the inner feelings of the peo­ple. Mian Sahib had not ruled the Punjab with a penchant for subjugation and suppression in the name of law and order. He was fair but firm, not yearning for false im­pact through bitter and co­ercive measures. He believed in truth, not tricks. My surveys already indicated success for the Muslim League in the Punjab but the projection of Nawaz Sharif’s fair and decent approach to both friends and foes was to make victory a certainty.

No victory without Jama’at. One day Mian Sahib asked me for a study on his own constituency in Lahore. I presented him the analysis with facts and figures, quoting 1985 results. He was happy that he had secured more than 60,000 votes in 1985.
“Nobody can defeat me,” he smugly said. “My seat is safe.”
“Unless you get the Jama’at-i-Islami votes, sir,” I commented.
“Why?” he asked. He was puzzled.
“Because you also got the PPP votes in 1985 as the party had boy­cotted the elections then,” I explained. “This time half of the votes will go to PPP and half to you. That means equal chances on both sides. You may even lose unless the 17,000 votes of the Jama’at-i-Is­lami come to you.”
I did not mince my words, or rather facts and figures, as it was my duty to tell him the truth. He got worried. I told him that Maulana Fateh Mu­hammad, Amir, Jama’at-i-Islami, Punjab, whom I knew from my Rawalpindi days, had asked me to convey to him that the Jama’at wanted to cooperate with him in the elections. He was not very fond of the Jama’at because of the constant misconduct and high-handed­ness of its student wing, Islami-Jami’at-i-Talaba (IJT). He asked me to suggest to Maulana Fateh Muham­mad that the Jama’at-i-Islami should not put up a candidate against him. I told him that it was a purely political matter and should be taken up by him­self or some other political colleague.
I also told him that the situation in many other constituencies was the same as in his own. The Jama’at votes varied from area to area and were transferable on the direction of the leadership. I showed him through a con­solidated chart the JI votes in various con­stituencies and how they could tilt the balance either way. That was the reason Maulana Fateh Muhammad suggested cooperation at the party level.
The prospect of a greater success finally persuaded Mian Sahib to agree to the suggestion of Maulana Fateh Muhammad. He asked Sattar Laleka, Malik Naeem and Siddique Kanju to talk to Jama’at-i-Islami through Liaquat Baloch and other JI members of the now defunct National Assembly. As co­operation between the two parties suited Liaquat Baloch and other JI candi­dates, conducive atmosphere was created through dialogue and both sides started coming closer to each other.

IJI comes into being. Before his death, Gen. Zia had been woo­ing Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to satisfy the Sindh sensitivity. In fact, he wanted him to join the Muslim League after he had dropped the pro­posal for the presi­dential system but Jatoi offered instead an alliance between the Muslim League and his National People’s Party. Tikka Iqbal had joined the NPP and was keen that the alliance, already approved by Zia, should be formed. He was also keen that Jatoi should become the caretaker Prime Minister, as de­cided by Gen. Zia on August 14. He requested Gen. Hameed Gul, Director General, In­ter Services Intelligence, that the new set-up might be informed about the decisions taken by Gen. Zia before his death.
The issue of the appointment of a caretaker Prime Minister was taken up in a meeting of the Emergency Council on August 27 but President Ghu­lam Ishaq did not agree although he was told that it was a constitu­tional re­quirement. He threatened to resign if the council pressed the point too much. The President did not want to give an impression that he was being dictated by the generals. He had also sensed that Gen. Aslam Beg had become de­fensive and vulnerable after the rumours that he was involved in the death of Gen. Zia. Ghulam Ishaq wanted to rule himself for the interim period as he was known to enjoy wield­ing arbi­trary authority

There were two major cases, by Mu­hammad Khan Junejo and Benazir Bhutto, before the Supreme Court and the Lahore High Court that could have direct impact on the politi­cal situation. Junejo had moved for the restoration of the National As­sembly and Benazir for elections to be held on party basis. Nawaz Sharif, however, did not bother about the cases and concentrated all his ener­gies on the election campaign. He believed that he stood to benefit in any case. If the Assemblies were restored, he would return to power. If, on the other hand, the elections were held on party basis, he would be ready to rally around himself all anti-PPP votes. He had a clear direction for the future what­ever the judgments of the superior courts.
The superior courts decided against the restoration of Assemblies and in favour of party-based elections. This caused an impetus to po­litical align­ments. The Muslim League, Jama’at-i-Islami and NPP came closer to each other as the elections drew nearer. Ch. Muham­mad Arshad had initiated the NPP factor to create a soothing effect in Sindh. Tikka Iqbal gave it the prac­tical shape by convincing Jatoi and President Zia. Nawaz Sharif carried the idea to its logical end. Maulana Fateh Muhammad took the initiative in bringing the Muslim League and Jama’at-i-Islami closer to each other. Ab­dul Sattar La­leka, Malik Naeem and Siddique Kanju made it a reality through Liaquat Baloch, who convinced Qazi Husain Ahmad, Amir, Jama’at-i-Islami. Gen. Fazal-i-Haq, Chief Minister, NWFP, also influenced Qazi Husain Ahmad. Tikka Iqbal requested Gen. Hameed Gul to help speed up the formation of the alliance, as it was the wish of the late President. Gen. Hameed Gul was so engrossed in the Afghan war that he referred Tikka Iqbal to Brig. Imtiaz. Iqbal was not much impressed by Brig. Imtiaz, whom he had met for the first time.
As Tikka told me, Mustafa Jatoi invited Nawaz Sharif, Gen. Fazal-i-Haq and Qazi Husain Ahmad to discuss the shape of alliance at the home of Dr Sarfaraz Mir of NPP in Islamabad. Brig. Imtiaz brought in Pir Fazal-i-Haq. Gen. Fazal-i-Haq had prevailed upon Maulana Sami-ul-Haq. The next day the parties of Fakhar Imam and Agha Poya also joined them. Thus came into being an electoral alliance against PPP, to be called Islami Jamhoori It­tehad (Islamic Democratic Front), which was later known by its Urdu ini­tials, IJI, even in English. Jatoi was elected as its first President and Prof. Ghafoor, of JI, as the Secretary General.
The formation of the IJI was not the brainchild of any individual. It evolved over three months, helped by various persons and circumstances. The dissolution of the Assemblies and the dismissal of a Sindhi Prime Minis­ter on May 29 and the crash of the Presidential plane on August 17 precipi­tated its formation as a compulsion of the new situ­ation. The fear of the PPP electoral victory brought all anti-PPP po­litical forces together. The same factor compelled the two groups of the Muslim League to reunite, with Junejo as the president of the united party.
On the other hand, the PPP was left alone as the MRD fell apart over the allocation of seats. Then PPP leadership made a big blunder. Over-rating its popular­ity, it caused internal bitterness and differences by arbitrary distri­bution of tickets to personal favourites. Many PPP aspirants, who had made sacrifices for the party and had been loyally serving it for long, were refused tickets. Some of them contested independently and caused the defeat of the party candidates by cutting into their votes. Some of them even accused the party leadership of selling the tickets.
The IJI showed excellent planning. Instead of allowing a fixed ratio of candi­dates to every party in the alliance, Asif Vardag proposed that the candidates likely to win should be given tickets irrespective of the allied party to which they belonged. The formula solved a major problem that was causing dissen­sion in the PPP. The standing of every candidate was tested with sta­tistics and surveys of the Special Branch. The hard and honest work of the Special Branch had replaced the usual guesswork in such matters. Every party was convinced of the veracity and impartiality of the sur­veys.
The IJI designed a simple green flag, with nine stars on it. It re­minded the people of the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance, which had launched a successful movement in 1977 against the tyrannical Bhutto government.

Special Branch surprises both sides. The elections were ar­ranged and conducted under the supervision of the judiciary. In every district, the District and Sessions Judge was the Returning Officer. The ex­ecutive was kept away from the electoral process and was to concen­trate on maintaining law and order only.
Our latest surveys indicated a slight edge to the IJI in the National As­sembly seats in the Punjab and a comfortable victory for the Pro­vincial As­sembly. Both sides were attracting big crowds. Benazir was popular but Nawaz Sharif was also not lagging behind. He had gone on a whirlwind tour of the province, attracting unprecedented crowds. The posters with his at­tractive portrait were in great demand. Benazir made a tactical mistake in her speech at Sargodha, criticizing Nawaz Sharif as a Punjabi. That statement, showing Benazir’s ethnic bias, helped Nawaz Sharif.
The elections to the National Assembly took place in a free, fair and peaceful atmosphere on November 16. The PPP got a slight edge over the IJI in the Punjab. The provincial elections on the 19th, however, gave a com­fortable majority to the IJI over PPP, with 33 independents. The Special Branch, on the basis of its surveys, had forecast the victory of those very in­dependents before hand and Nawaz Sharif had already been in touch with them. As the results came in, he would pick up the phone and congratulate the winning independents. Due to his timely personal initiative, 32 inde­pendent MPAs out of 33 joined the Muslim League the very next day. By the time the PPP thought about them, it was too late. To cover up its failure, the PPP leadership later falsely accused Mian Sahib of having used adminis­tra­tive machinery to win over the independents.
The Special Branch forecast was correct up to almost 95%. Those who believed that I had given a very rosy picture to Gen. Zia and Nawaz Sharif were surprised. In fact, the stunned IJI leadership, including Mian Sahib, believed that I was “a wizard” while the PPP leadership viewed me as “wicked.” Both were off the mark. I had just done my job with my eyes and ears open and went into de­tails without any prejudice before formulating my views or forecasts.
I worked with dedication so that democratic process might stabi­lize and flourish. If I had not given my honest assessment about the election outcome and Gen. Zia had continued to believe the gloomy and unrealistic forecasts that he had been receiving from all sides, the democracy would not have survived for long. I had also contributed to the revival of the political process and the consequent 1985 elec­tions. I gave encouragement for the 1987 local bodies elections when every­body in the high circles was chickening out. I gave them the courage to face the 1988 general elections boldly and squarely by giving cor­rect and realistic forecasts instead of the usual guesswork. I knew that all rul­ers had been turned neurotic by their intelligence agencies, which gave panicky reports to save their own skin if anything went wrong. I did not like to cheat anybody. I wanted the elections to take place and that needed courage in the ruling elite.
The PPP leadership believed, most erroneously, that I must have done something wrong to manipulate the results to conform to my own forecast. Otherwise, they wondered, how could I predict so correctly? I felt dismayed and disturbed when I heard that PPP leaders were misinterpreting my honest hard work and proper un­der­standing of the situation, to cover up their own failings. Some people, like Rao Rashid, who were the prisoners of their own propaganda and make-believe world, had given an unrealis­tic and rosy picture to Benazir of a resounding victory in the Punjab. When the results came contrary to their assessments, they made me the scapegoat in­stead of facing and stating the truth to their leader­ship.
They did not happen to realize that I had worked hard, honestly and with commitment to democracy. If the elections were not held, how could they come in power? The elections were held because the people who mat­tered were made aware convincingly that the PPP was not likely to have a total sway. I had the same view even immediately after the tragedy on August 17. How could there be any rigging when judiciary was managing the elections? What could the poor Special Branch do? It could, at the most, put up its assessments but had little influence or authority.
The official influence did go in favour of IJI but that was not the whole story. The dynamic, sincere and clean leadership of Nawaz Sharif, with his politics of decency, had touched the hearts of the peo­ple. The ef­fective and intelligent publicity and better candidates could not be easily defeated. The PPP had isolated itself arrogantly, result­ing in a split in the MRD, while the anti-PPP parties had united to rally the votes and resources behind them. It was very strange that the PPP was casting doubts on the same elections that had catapulted it into power and led to the defeat of people like Jatoi and Junejo.

Split mandate. The elections produced mixed results. The rural Sindh gave an overwhelmingly sentimental verdict in favour of the PPP, totally routing all other parties. On the other hand, the Muhajirs, concentrated in urban centers like Karachi and Hyderabad, voted on ethnic lines exclusively for the Muhajir Qaumi Movement. The ethnic divide in Sindh became very obvious although it was not difficult to anticipate it as the oppressive martial law had driven the people into smaller identities for self-survival. Balochis­tan had largely followed the tribal lines, with Nawab Akbar Bugti dominating the scene. The Pathan-Baloch divide was manifest in the backdrop of a dest­abilized Afghanistan. The North West Frontier Province gave a split verdict for the major parties, the PPP, the Muslim League, Awami National Party and Jami’at-i-Ulema-i-Islam. The disturbed Afghanistan and defeated USSR could no longer cast their long dark shadows over the province and the politi­cal destinies of all parties were now within Pakistan after a favourable geo­political change. The people of the Punjab gave a really split mandate, with a slight edge to the PPP in the National Assembly and a clear majority to the Muslim League in the Provincial Assembly.
The political scenario that emerged after the elections had built-in checks and balances. After getting rid of the military autocracy, the voters now rejected party dictatorship. The people voted for democ­racy in the real sense but the three main leaders had little experience in running and manag­ing a democratic system. Benazir Bhutto had suf­fered under martial law and the bitterness in her heart was overflow­ing. Altaf Husain was a reactionary, the product of a suf­foca­tion created by the bigotry and violence of Jama’at-i-Islami in Ka­rachi. Nawaz Sharif had, no doubt, managed the MNAs and MPAs in the Punjab for three years but he had to carry the unwholesome burden through a system of spoils against his own natural inclinations.
The political parties have ideologies and issues while individual politi­cians have their own interests. The partyless elections of 1985 produced MNAs and MPAs without any party glue or goals. Nawaz Sharif carried the liabilities of the individualistic politics and tried to create some ideological cement for the scattered bricks while at the same time learning and graduat­ing into party and power politics. He assumed to himself the role of a de­fender of the new evolving political system under attack from the PPP. The old guard, like Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan and Wali Khan, were still in search of the ideal democratic prac­tices that could help steer the ship as stabilizers only after the young angry leaders had blown out the heat of their hatred against each other.

Mustafa Khar had fallen out with Jatoi when the latter went into alliance with Nawaz Sharif. Khar wanted to join the PPP but met with stonewalling from Begum Nusrat Bhutto. He went his own way and won two National Assembly seats from Muzaffargarh, his home dis­trict. Khar and the MRD parties abandoned by the PPP were to play a very significant role against the PPP Government in the near future.

The numbers game and three wise men. Considering the mixed election results, there was a jockeying for power. Benazir Bhutto demanded immediate transfer of power as her party had emerged as the largest single party in the National Assembly although it did not have the required majority. She blamed the establishment for intrigues to keep her out of power at the federal level. In the Punjab, the Chief Minister Secretariat was humming with political activity, as the IJI parties were euphoric on their impressive score in the province.
The numbers game started most seriously. Nawaz Sharif con­tacted most of the political leaders outside the IJI, including Altaf Husain, of MQM, and Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman, of Jami’at-i-Ulema-i-Islam. I saw, at 7 Club Road, Qazi Husain Ahmad and Prof. Khur­shid, of Jama’at-i-Islami, discussing the emerging political sce­nario with Brig. Imtiaz. They calcu­lated that Nawaz Sharif could become the Prime Minister with a “taxicab majority” of two or three members if all smaller parties in the house could be coalesced. (The term “taxicab majority” originated in England in 1964 when the Labour Party won a majority of only four seats. The joke was that if four La­bour MPs were held in traffic while going to Parliament in a taxi for a crucial vote, the government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson could fall. The government, however, continued even with a majority of a single seat until it called early elections, and lost!)
The three wise men appeared to be very serious about forming an IJI government at the center and I listened to them silently. Thinking about the sentimental vote by the rural Sindh, I was afraid that there would be serious trouble if Benazir was kept out of power. The 1984 scenario also started haunting me. I could not remain silent.
“Qazi Sahib, statistics cannot stand before a storm,” I said. “How will you control Sindh even if Mian Sahib becomes the Prime Minis­ter? There will be perpetual trouble. Sindhis will feel cheated. It looks like a misadven­ture.” They did not like my intervention.
I discussed it later with Brig. Imtiaz alone also. He had a horrify­ing plan. “Even if it did not work, Mian Sahib could dissolve the Na­tional As­sembly and ask for fresh elections.”
“Why bring a bad name for Mian Sahib by such a suggestion?” I asked. But he had his own dreams of glory and power and did not like my views.
It appeared that the ground for another martial law was being pre­pared. I advised Mian Sahib that he had a great future and should not try to become the Prime Minister with an ephemeral majority. If he was pushed by cir­cumstances into dissolving the National Assembly, the taint of an undemo­cratic action would damage his future prospects. “Let somebody else play that role,” I said. “It looks like a trap to me.” He listened to me and re­mained silent. Either he did not like it or wanted to think it over.

“Not at the cost of Pakistan.” I discussed the scenario with Farid-ud-Din Ahmad, Secretary to the Chief Minister, and the disas­trous path on which Mian Sahib was being led. He agreed with my views. Then I dis­cussed it with Anwar Zahid, the Chief Secretary, who also agreed with my views and suggested that all of us should go to Mian Sahib together and put across our point of view. Anwar Za­hid, Farid-ud-Din and I met Mian Sahib at 7, Club Road, in the even­ing. (Haji Akram was down with a serious heart attack.)
Anwar Zahid was very analytical and persuasive and dilated in detail on the likely evil consequences but Mian Sahib looked quite tempted to become the Prime Minister. It was, after all, but natural that a young man in such a situation should aspire for the highest po­litical office.
Then I picked up the argument and drew a graphic scenario of likely blood bath and subversion in the rural Sindh. I could see that he was begin­ning to visualize the difficulties arising out of a people’s re­volt. I told him that the army failed to control the situation after the 1983 MRD movement and Gen. Zia finally had to opt for a political initiative to improve matters. I said, “Nobody should try to reverse that healing process, especially after the people have given their ver­dict. We know what happened in East Pakistan after the elections. When you go against the general feelings of the people, the result is always a disaster. If that blunder is repeated now, history will never forgive us. Sindh will be burning. Communications will be dis­rupted. The rail and road links will be cut off. Nothing will move up­country from the Karachi port. Economy will come to a standstill. Sir, Prime Ministership at what cost? Not at the cost of the country.” I had be­come quite sentimen­tal. I could see that he too had become emotional as his face by now was glowing.
“Not at the cost of Pakistan,” he said finally. “Not at the cost of Pakis­tan. Not at all. But are you sure that the events can take that kind of turn.”
I was exhausted emotionally by that time. So Anwar Zahid said, “Yes, absolutely. Sardar is hundred per cent right.”
“In that case I drop the idea.” He had made up his mind. “Everything of mine is for Pakistan. My honour, life, property, family and children are all for Pakistan. I hope Pakistan remains safe in Benazir’s hands. Sindhis are good people. She is not much of a Sindhi, any­way.”