28

Good-bye, Junejo Sain
Power, like a mistress, cannot be shared willingly. Therefore, jealous­ies, suspicions and intrigues are not uncommon in the chambers and corri­dors of power. Conspiracy theories abound and even innocuous incidents are projected as serious threats. The funny thing is that suspicions arise in in­verse proportion to the ini­tial trust.
Zia had nominated as Prime Minister a lit­tle-known poli­tician of me­diocre abilities in the firm belief that he would never face any problem, not to speak of a threat to his rule. But once in power, even pigmies grow in stat­ure. Power turned a docile and inept Junejo into a man of vaulting ambi­tions, especially after his state visit to the U.S. Pir Pagara, in an allegory made widely known through his press statements in those days, com­pared Junejo with a mouse that roared and had visions of overpower­ing even the cat (Zia).
With neither a political base nor the loyalty of most of the MNAs (who had been elected on non-party basis), Muhammad Khan Junejo, in a travesty of facts, started claiming that it was he who had banished the martial law. (The credit deservedly went to Gen. Zia.) Moreover, rather than being grate­ful to Zia for bailing him out in several consti­tutional crises, Junejo started asserting him­self. On the other side, he had morbid fears that Nawaz Sharif, with his strong political base in the Punjab, could replace him with the help of President Zia. As a result, he made many blunders that ultimately led to his being booted out. Junejo, who had boasted that he would make even the generals sit in 800cc compact Suzuki cars, left the Prime Minis­ter House without a whimper, really like a mouse driven away by a cat.

Senate elections in 1988. Elections were due in March 1988 to half of the total seats of the Senate that had fallen vacant under the Consti­tution. Some groups in the Punjab tried to make it a show of strength to undermine the position of Nawaz Sharif. A large number of independent candi­dates filed their nomination papers and some wheeling and dealing started behind the scene. It was generally speculated that many of the Muslim League MPAs would violate the party discipline and, thereby, demonstrate Mian Sa­hib’s lack of grip. Many suspected the Prime Minister to be behind the move.
According to my analysis, based on a careful study, there was little pos­sibility of it. Mian Shuja-ur-Rahman, Rafique Ghaori, Mukhtar Tikka, Shafiq Arif and some other independent aspi­rants were in the field. I knew most of them personally. They had their per­sonal ambitions, no doubt, but I could not find any plan be­hind their move. But my appreciation of the situa­tion went unheeded. The con­spiracy theorists continued to unnerve the Chief Minister and some of them were sowing the seeds of mistrust by giving him the im­pression that the Prime Minister was behind the move against him.
The independent candidates had their own problems and would have liked to settle after bargaining, as usually happens in our politics. One had only to know their mind and objectives through political channels. Instead, I found the administration active in contacting and coercing them. I informed the Chief Minister and also dilated on its un­desirable consequences. I re­quested him to forbid the administration and instead ask his political team to handle the matter.
He asked Ghulam Haider Wyne to get in touch with the inde­pendent candidates while I was directed to give Wyne Sahib all avail­able information on the background and objectives of the candidates. Wyne did get in touch with them. As required under the law, every nomination paper had an MPA proposing the candi­date’s name and another sec­onding it. So, Wyne con­tacted the proposers and the seconders belonging to the Muslim League and, un­der the party discipline, directed them to with­draw their support to the independents. They did so and most of the candi­dates were left high and dry.
Once they lost the support of even the sponsors of their nominations, the inde­pendents needed only a graceful way out. Nawaz Sharif himself provided that. Mian Shuja-ur-Rahman and Mukhtar Tikka came to Haji Akram and asked for just an interview with the Chief Min­ister before with­drawing. It was arranged. Rafique Ghaori also wanted to see the Chief Minister and withdrew after his interview was arranged through Dr Safdar Mahmood. So did Shafiq Arif after a similar gesture.
I asked my friend Tikka Iqbal, “You did not ask the Chief Minis­ter for any favour for yourself or for your brother Mukhtar. Then why did you want to see Mian Sahib?”
“It was for appearance sake only, Chaudhry Sahib,” he confided. “We wanted to give an impression to our constituents that we with­drew on the re­quest of the Chief Minister. We can now maintain and con­solidate our po­litical position in the eyes of our people.”
Similar was the position of the other withdrawing candidates but the opponents of Nawaz Sharif alleged some underhand dealings in their press statements. It was totally baseless as most of the candidates were very self-respecting persons of good background. Nawaz Sharif ensured a smooth un­opposed election of his candidates for the Senate, something that was not achieved even by Bhutto. This spectacular achievement made some Muslim League circles jealous of him. Some newspapers called him “a threat to the Prime Minister.” The reality was that he achieved an enviable success simply by han­dling a political issue politically and not through the misuse of the administration. Many considered it impossible and hence un­believ­able.
Two very senior bureaucrats were annoyed with me because I had de­prived them of an opportunity to please the Chief Minister through their ad­ministrative tricks. One of them called me, to my hor­ror, “a great politi­cian.” I had done nothing more than advising the Chief Minister to refrain from us­ing the administration.

Ojhri Camp explosion. In the morning of April 10, 1988, A/Hameed, my friend and Director Re­search, was in the Special Branch of­fice in Sat­ellite Town, Rawalpindi, when there was a very big blast somewhere nearby. While the SP pondered the pros and cons of telling his boss (me) about the explosion without first getting details, A/Hameed picked up the phone and informed me immediately about it. Soon af­terwards, Mirza Muhammad Ali, SP, told me that the arms and am­munition dump at Ojhri Camp had caught fire and the missiles stacked there were raining death and des­truction all around. It took many hours and many lives before it could be controlled. More than a hun­dred lives were estimated to have been lost, including a former fed­eral minister and MNA from Murree, Khaqan Abbasi. There was ex­tensive damage to property.
Anwar Zahid and I rushed to Rawalpindi for rehabilita­tion, relief and damage control measures. Nawaz Sharif was flying that day from Morocco to Lon­don on an of­ficial visit. He canceled his tour and rushed to Rawal­pindi. He went round the city, consol­ing and comforting the affected peo­ple. He ar­ranged within days on-the-spot payment of compensation under his personal supervision. It was one of the most efficient and speediest relief operations ever un­dertaken by a government. The dynamic lead­ership of Mian Sahib performed almost a miracle, overwhelming the usual perfunctor­iness of the lethargic bureaucrats. It went a long way in consoling the vic­tims.

The explosion at the Ojhri Camp caused serious differences in the ruling oligarchy. The huge quantities of arms and ammunition had been coming from abroad and were stored at Ojhri before onward shipment to the Afghan mujahideen. The camp was located in a con­gested city area and posed a se­rious danger to the people living around it. The press played up the incident to expose the carelessness of the army, particularly of the Inter Services In­telligence (ISI), which was control­ling the operations. Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, former ISI chief, and Gen. Hameed Gul, the current chief, were made special tar­gets by the press. The Prime Minister constituted a three-member minis­terial in­quiry com­mission. The National Assembly wanted to discuss the is­sue while the opposition outside, particularly PPP, wanted to drive the point home against President Zia, who was also the army chief.

The opposition and some other forces were active in driving a wedge between the President and the Prime Minister, whose relations were already extremely strained after the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan. The President, who was the architect of the Afghan policy, felt betrayed when Junejo, under Russian and American pressure, rushed into a set­tlement without resolving some basic issues, especially the formation of an interim government in Af­ghanistan. The General was furious when he saw the Americans abandoning their re­sponsibilities towards the suffering Afghans. Once the Russians had been humbled and hounded out, the Americans were leaving the bleeding and bat­tered Afghan Muslims to internal strife and destruction. The General held Junejo responsible for it. In the eyes of the President, the Prime Min­ister had also committed the unfor­givable sin of calling a conference of all parties, in­cluding the PPP, before bowing to external pressures for an ac­cord in Ge­neva. The General viewed all politicians responsible for the Ge­neva fiasco.
The Ojhri camp disaster added to the General’s discomfiture, with the specter of its being openly discussed in Parliament. The other generals were afraid that they too would be on the mat. Suddenly, it seemed that the army was in the dock and Parlia­ment was going to be its prosecutor. That was not tolerable to the top brass. Parliament, which they had themselves created through non-party elections, was going beyond its mandate granted to it by them. They felt trapped in a blind alley.

It was obvious that Gen. Zia was convinced of a collusion be­tween the ruling Muslim League and the hated PPP against him and the army. The situation seemed to be assuming a very dangerous di­men­sion of military ver­sus politicians. We were back to 1984, 1977 and 1971, with all disrup­tive possibilities. I was extremely perturbed as I could see that something disastrous could take place any time, wasting all the love’s labour that I had put in during my days in the Federal Security Cell in 1984, writing notes for the return of democracy. Eve­rything was about to be blown away.
I expressed my apprehensions to Dr Safdar Mahmood and Haji Akram. They already had the same fears. We thought of going over to Nawaz Sharif, who was going to Korea with the Prime Minister the next day. Dr Safdar Mahmood put across to Mian Sahib our read­ing of the situation most elo­quently and effectively, with historical per­spective, and requested him to be a bridge between the President and the Prime Minister. The situation could be defused through a controlled dis­cus­sion behind closed doors in the par­liamentary defence committee. To re­move misunderstandings and conse­quent fears of the generals, Dr Saf­dar suggested that Mian Sahib should bring the President and the Prime Minister on one table to discuss the mo­dalities of the parliamen­tary commit­tee discussion before he and Junejo left for Korea. Mian Sahib promised to play his part for reconciliation but most prob­ably it did not work. We could not check the de­velopments as the events moved with lightening speed.
While Gen. Zia was still smarting under the painful feeling of be­trayal at Geneva and the menacing moves of politicians on the Ojhri Camp inci­dent, an unfortunate clash between an MPA and a few young army officers in Rawalpindi exacerbated the already tense at­mosphere. The MPA an­nounced that he would move a privilege mo­tion in the Provincial Assembly. That added fuel to fire. As the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister were out of the country, the President called Ghulam Haider Wyne and Malik Saleem Iqbal to Rawalpindi to resolve the issue.
Malik Saleem Iqbal talked to me before meeting the President. I briefed him on the perception of the generals as far as I knew and ad­vised him to satisfy the President that nothing irritating would take place in the Assembly. I told him, “Let one MPA suffer instead of the whole assembly. Don’t push the general to a point where he finds it better to wind up the whole forum. You must remove all his fears.” He agreed with me.
Saleem Iqbal discussed the matter with Ghulam Haider. Wyne thought it fit that he should plead the case of the MPA also while pla­cating the Gen­eral. No doubt, the MPA and his family had been beaten and insulted by the young officers on a marriage gathering at his own house. He had a genuine grouse and certainly needed to be consoled. The matter, however, could have been taken up separately with the General for action against the defaulters and the issue would have been resolved in due course.
The General felt that raising the issue in the Assembly was to scandalize the army and to challenge his authority. Wyne, as a politi­cian, explained that all issues would get defused and diluted by dis­cussion in the house but failed to grasp the sensibilities of the General, who had ruled the country un­ques­tioned and unchallenged for so many years. Unfortunately, he lacked the needed diplomatic skills and finesse. So, he annoyed Zia by unneces­sary arguments and finally said that the whole matter would be placed before the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister on their return from abroad. He him­self could have killed the issue by taking over the responsibility to resolve it as he was also a very senior party leader.
Malik Saleem Iqbal told me after the meeting that the General was very furi­ous and had observed tauntingly, “What assemblies and what privileges of members? The soldiers also need protection from mud sling­ing.” Saleem Iqbal feared that the General was not going to spare any­body and was “up to something very serious.” That is what happened on May 29, 1988. The Prime Minister was just back from his tour abroad when the President dis­solved the National and the Provincial Assemblies, using his authority under the 8th amendment to the Con­stitution.

Nawaz Sharif, who had accompanied the Prime Minister, rushed to La­hore from Rawalpindi. In a meeting, he disclosed that he was likely to con­tinue as the caretaker Chief Minister, as had been indi­cated to him by the President. Nawaz Sharif believed that the Presi­dent should be taken along carefully and tactfully to ensure an­other election and to safeguard the politi­cal system. “Thank God he acted as the President and not as the Chief of Army Staff,” he observed.

In search of a new shape of things. In early morning on May 30, Arshad Chaudhri rang me from Karachi. “What has the Presi­dent done?” His voice had anger. “Has he gone mad? He hanged one Sindhi Prime Minister and has now dismissed another. He has once again opened up the painful wounds of the Sindhis that had started healing. Sindh still sulks. Please try to save it as you have already done silently so many times before.”
“What can I do right now?” I asked. “I am totally perplexed. Please guide me and I shall try to do anything that can help the coun­try.”
He had a definite suggestion. “Zia is going to bet on Nawaz Sharif now. Both are Punjabis. It cannot work because Sindh will get estranged and go out of control. Pir Pagara cannot be helpful as the dismissed Prime Minister was his disciple. Even if he can, the injured trust cannot be re­stored. The only person after Benazir who can carry Sindhis with him is Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. He needs to be associated in some form in the new set-up. Put it in the mind of Mian Sahib so that he can talk to the President.”
His proposal had some weight in it. Jatoi had parted ways with the PPP and had formed his own National People’s Party. NPP had many heavy-weights in its fold, including Mustafa Khar from the Punjab, but the party had failed to take off. While keeping all that in my mind, I asked him, “Have you discussed this with Jatoi Sahib? I have never met him but his party is just so so.”
“I have not discussed anything with Jatoi yet,” he replied. “My sugges­tions is only to save the country from the stupidities of the rul­ers.”
I asked him to sound Jatoi casually before I spoke to the Chief Minister. Arshad Chaudhri had a point and Sindhis must not be alienated unnecessarily. I told Haji Akram about Arshad’s suggestion and he agreed wholeheartedly that it must not become a Punjab show in the given circumstances.
Nawaz Sharif discussed the new situation with Haji Akram, who was working as Additional Chief Secretary in those days. Haji Sahib later told me that the President had advised Mian Sahib to be­come the President of the Muslim League and Mian Sahib had liked the idea. Haji Sahib advised against it, as that would practically make it the Punjab League. It would be better if some old Muslim Leaguer from a smaller province headed it.
After two days, Arshad Chaudhri told me that Jatoi did not warm up to the idea and now I should put it across to Mian Sahib in the hope that he may pursue it on his own in the best interest of the country. I talked to Mian Sa­hib but he did not attach much im­portance to the Sindh factor. Pir Pagara met Zia on June 8 and, considering that he was in difficulties, tried to dictate his own terms on the formation of the caretaker cabinet. The President did not yield and they fell out with each other.
I later learnt that the Pir, being annoyed on certain matters, had turned against Junejo, his own disciple as well as nominee as Prime Minister, and, in fact, even helped in his ouster. Now he expected a lot from the President but the General did not oblige.

Lure of the presidential system. Tikka Iqbal and Haji Akram believed that Sindh must not be ignored or bulldozed and Jatoi was the only option available. On the insistence of Iqbal, I wrote an analysis of the situation with se­curity implications of the Sindh factor and gave it to Mian Sahib. On the other side, Tikka Iqbal went to Karachi and met Jatoi. He told me later that Jatoi’s reaction was not very encouraging as the General, ac­cording to Jatoi, was going for the presidential form of government and there would be no scope in it for any politician worth the name.
I had also learnt that Gen. Zia was considering the presidential system as he had become allergic to the parliamentary form. It made me wor­ried as, in my view, the presidential system would promote the re­gional and secession­ist forces that had already harmed the country ir­reparably. The presidential sys­tem of Ayub Khan had created such an intense alienation and deprivation among the people and politicians that it resulted ultimately in the separation of East Pakistan.
It seemed that Gen. Zia had really gone berserk. He had started dis­trusting everybody and was preparing schemes for direct and personal rule, just short of martial law. He was not allowing even the expansion of the Punjab care­taker cabinet beyond two ministers and Nawaz Sharif had to work very hard to persuade him to allow more ministers. I came to know that the expansion was allowed only when the General was convinced that a larger cabinet, with its ability to influence more people, would help him in winning the presiden­tial election.
Jatoi had the correct information about the intentions of the Presi­dent but the brilliance and vehemence of Iqbal did persuade him to come out of the political slumber. Iqbal convinced him that he should play his role, even on a low profile, to restrain the President from the precipice and himself emerge as a possible alternative from the sensi­tive province of Sindh. On the impor­tance of the Sindh factor, he brought around even Nawaz Sharif, who now asked me to remain in touch with Jatoi through Tikka for a dia­logue at an appro­priate occasion. I came to know later that Tikka was also in touch with the President, trying to convince him that the presidential form of government would ultimately become a Punjab show, to the annoyance of smaller prov­inces, particularly Sindh. I was very impressed that Tikka Iqbal was able to open windows on all sides.
Iqbal urged a political role for Jatoi but the President thought that Jatoi might not be agreeable. Tikka took on himself to persuade Jatoi that he had already done half way. He played his cards extremely well and in the best interest of the country, projecting the ill effects of the presidential form. The President had announced elections for Novem­ber 16, 1988, on non-party ba­sis despite having revived the political parties and the Muslim League having ruled the country for more than two years. One wondered how he would overcome the glaring con­tradiction but everybody appeared reconciled if the political proc­ess could be saved. The veteran politicians were giving mildly critical statements, only for public consumption. The General appeared ad­venturous while the politicians were circumspect.
The Muslim League split into Junejo Group and Nawaz Sharif Group. Both groups were for elections. Junejo, naturally, could not go along with the President while Nawaz Sharif wanted to carry the President with him so that he might not take any more drastic meas­ures. Junejo Group wanted restoration of the dissolved Assemblies but that would definitely create complications and make the General des­perate. The General had made the ultimate move and it was extremely important that everything was done to keep him on a political course.

Face to face with the General. Gen. Zia visited Lahore on Au­gust 9 for a briefing on law and order. Nawaz Sharif was in favour of the presiden­tial form of government and wanted Anwar Zahid and me to support the pro­posal. I knew that even Gen. Fazal-i-Haq, one of Zia’s closest col­leagues and now caretaker Chief Minister of NWFP, had not supported the idea, as it was not in line with the public opinion. As the Special Branch chief, I was asked to begin my presen­tation to the President and the Punjab cabinet with the latest law and order situation. I was also expected to give my assessment about the coming elections. I had all the facts and figures readily available due to my earlier surveys for the local bodies elections. I projected an im­pressive victory for the Muslim League over PPP in the Pun­jab and the fal­ling apart of the MRD as it was a movement, not an electoral alliance. Un­like 1985, this time PPP would not miss the op­portunity of participating in the elections. So, I pre­sented a victory sce­nario for the General and his group of the Muslim League.
Then I took up the proposed change in the form of government. The presidential form of government, I submitted, was not to the liking of the people, as it tended to be arbitrary, autocratic and dictatorial. The people pre­ferred a responsible government through Parliament. By toppling Ayub Khan, the people had given their verdict against his form of government in spite of the fact that he had done great devel­opment work. The people wanted participation in the affairs of the state through their representatives and did not want to be ruled by an auto­crat.
The General heard me with rapt attention, especially when I quoted the example of Bhutto, who, in his desire for absolute authority, lost even his available authority that was returning to him anyway through a simple ma­jority in 1977 elections. Bhutto was trying to secure two-thirds majority to amend the constitution into a presidential form. That vaulting ambition ulti­mately cost him even his position as the Prime Minister. Bhutto was a pow­erful Prime Minister. No MNA could dare to go against him because of his political stature, not due to any constitu­tional authority. The people rejected authoritarianism of Ayub Khan and Bhutto out rightly. I clearly told the Gen­eral and the Pun­jab cabi­net that any attempt to introduce the presidential system was likely to cause widespread agitation by the MRD and other po­litical forces.
I could see that Nawaz Sharif was feeling uneasy but Gen. Zia showed no reaction whatsoever. He was listening to my discourse against the presi­dential system absolutely unperturbed and with full attention.
I continued by saying that a clear lesson of our recent history was that all governments, civilian or military, had been overthrown by the people when they took away their civil liberties. On the other hand, a de­cent man­ner of governance, as being exercised in the Punjab by Nawaz Sharif, en­deared the ruler to the people. The people felt happy, satisfied and secure in a free and fair environment. Mian Sahib had achieved the ideal peace not through co­ercive use of his legal authority but by his piety, grace and kind­ness and with firm commitment to equity and justice. The people responded to him with warmth and admiration. I could see that Mian Sahib was feeling pleased. In fact I was trying to bring him over to save the pre­sent political system before the adventurism of the General pushed the country back into another dark era of unbridled authoritarianism.
I carefully and tactfully developed my briefing to prove, in pleas­ant and palatable terminology, that an ill-conceived plan for presiden­tial system might complicate matters. The General might lose his grip on the situation by ask­ing for too much as had happened in the past in our country. He should manage carefully and sagaciously what was al­ready available. In conclusion, I once again drew a victory scenario to encourage the General to preserve the present political system.
Initially I was allowed only seven minutes but the President asked me to complete my presentation without consideration of any time limit, as he got engrossed in my unusually different style of briefing. After my hour-long speech, the IGP, the Home Secretary and the Chief Secretary spoke briefly, generally supporting my views. In the wind­ing up, the President compli­mented me on my otherwise unwelcome briefing against the presidential system. He told the Punjab cabinet that “the advice of Ch. Sardar, although contrary to my own initial views, is extremely useful and worth considera­tion.” Governor Sajjad Husain Qureshi and Nawaz Sharif also compli­mented me and con­veyed their appreciation.
I was glad that I had done my job by expressing my honest views and it might help to keep the political process on the track. Malik Saleem was, however, worried that I had risked my job by going beyond my man­date.
I said, “The President has expressed his satisfaction. So, why worry?”
Malik Saleem Iqbal replied, “The General has said all that for the sake of appearance. He will harm you later on.”
“I shall not suffer from any unfounded fears and I shall do my duty cor­rectly and conscientiously,” I said. I knew that many things went wrong only because of the neurosis and paranoia of the functionaries at important posi­tions in the government. I had put across many apparently un­palatable but objectively correct views and propositions to rulers many a time in my career and they had agreed with me most of the times. Still the observation of Malik Sahib made me feel concerned and some timidity did overtake me after the briefing.

Anwar Zahid and I had a long session with Sid­dique Salik, who was very close to the President. He observed that I had presented a very optimis­tic pic­ture about the elections. He said, “I can’t believe your as­sessment that the Muslim League, which is already split, can win the November elec­tions even on non-party basis. The law and order will collapse and civil ad­ministration has no strength. It is too risky. Once the people’s mandate is manifest, you can’t do any­thing. You cannot even impose martial law after such a sce­nario. It will be like East Pakistan. Benazir will come and destroy every­thing.” Then, looking into my eyes, he added, “Chaudhry Sahib, you have been unfair to the General.”
I found him too frightened. Anwar Zahid also tried to convince him but he would not change his mind. I asked him the basis and grounds for his pessimistic view. He said that they had many assess­ments from many quar­ters. “You are the only one with an optimistic view. You cannot read the writing on the wall.” I felt concerned that he would later wash away the healthy impact of my briefing on the President. I showed him the volumi­nous copies of my surveys to prove my impartial and factual assessments but to no avail. I pointed out how frightened everybody was even at the time of the local bodies elections and I was the only one whose assessment was vin­dicated by later events but he was not impressed at all. He thought the presi­den­tial system was the only way out. Such inflexible and pessimistic opin­ions were either based on propaganda or on gut feelings. Fear played a major role. Generals and politicians both had a pathological fear of the elections.

Split in Muslim League. After my vigorous briefing on August 9, Gen. Zia decided to go ahead with the November elections. He also decided to try to unify the Muslim League, after choosing its head from a smaller province. He got in touch with Pir Pagara and through him persuaded Mu­hammad Khan Junejo to step down in favour of Fi­da Muhammad Khan, an old Muslim Leaguer from NWFP. The Mus­lim League Council (Fida group) met in Lahore on August 12 and ratified the agreement. All important Mus­lim Leaguers from all over the country attended the meeting and decided to hold a combined meeting of both groups in Islamabad the next day to merge the groups and to elect Fida Muhammad Khan unanimously as the President of the Muslim League.
Nawaz Sharif asked me to check from Tikka Iqbal if Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi would join the Muslim League. Tikka knew that Jatoi was in Islamabad and went to see him there. Mian Sahib also wanted to see Jatoi. He asked me to go to Rawalpindi as he himself was going there for the Muslim League meeting. I met him in the morning of August 13 in his Railway saloon in Rawalpindi. He wanted Tikka Iqbal and me to remain available, as he wanted to see Jatoi after the meeting. According to him, it would take very little time as the Pir and the President had already settled everything. Tikka and I went to Holiday Inn (now Marriott) Hotel in Islamabad and waited for him in the lobby while the meeting was going on in the hotel. The meeting turned out to be that of the Fida group only and the combined meeting was to take place in the Islamabad Hotel (now Holiday Inn).
Tikka met Mian Sahib in the Holiday Inn lobby and advised him not to go to Islamabad Hotel. His view was that the majority was with him in the Holiday Inn and there was no need to go to the splinter group, which would definitely create trouble. But Nawaz Sharif did not agree with him and told him to come along to Islamabad Hotel and from there they would go to see Jatoi. Tikka was not happy to be in the Muslim League crowd but anyway he and I went to the Islamabad Hotel after about half an hour of Mian Sa­hib’s departure, and waited in the lobby. While we were enjoying our cup of coffee, Qamar-uz-Zaman, Private Secretary to the Chief Minister, came run­ning and told me that there was trouble in the meeting and that Rana Naeem and other companions of Junejo had attacked Mian Sahib. Tikka and I went in to see what was happening. We saw that there was a lot of shouting in the hall from both sides but there was apparently no secu­rity threat to anybody. We came back to the lobby and finished our coffee.
There was no merger of Fida and Junejo groups. Instead, Junejo and Hamid Nasir Chattha later issued a statement against me, claiming that Nawaz Sharif had brought the Additional IGP, Special Branch, and his men into the meeting. It was a white lie. There was not a sin­gle man from the Special Branch and I was noticed there only because I had come from the lobby with Tikka for a short time. My presence was exploited to bring a bad name to Nawaz Sharif. I asked my old friend, Aziz Qureshi, a leading mem­ber of the Junejo group, “Why such a baseless statement has been issued against me?” His frank re­ply was, “It was a political game and there is nothing against you per­sonally.” I protested vehemently but they were not regretful. They did not bother that the people who read the news­papers be­lieved that I had gone into a politi­cal meeting, despite being a public servant, to help Nawaz Sharif. My mere presence was blown up out of proportion to create an impression that the Chief Minister, contrary to facts, depended to­tally on adminis­trative machinery for his politics.
Before he left the hotel, Mian Sahib asked me and Tikka to come to the Frontier House. There he told us that he wanted to meet Ghu­lam Mustafa Jatoi, along with Zafarulla Jamali, Chief Minister, Balochis­tan, and Fazl-i-Haq, Chief Minister, NWFP. Jatoi de­clined to come to the Frontier House.
It was then arranged that all of them meet at the home of my friend, Ch. Muhammad Arshad. I took Nawaz Sharif and the other two Chief Ministers to the residence of Arshad Chaudhri and Tikka brought Jatoi there. It was a long meeting. I do not know what passed between them but Tikka told me later that Jatoi declined to join the Muslim League and instead proposed an elec­toral alliance of Muslim League and his NPP. Jatoi and the three Chief Ministers decided to finalize their alli­ance after meeting the President. Jatoi met the President the same evening and discussed the possible electoral alli­ance of the Muslim League (Fida group) and the NPP. According to Tikka, Jatoi was of the view that a much better political arrangement would be pos­sible if the President could nominate Jatoi as the caretaker Prime Minister. I said, “That should not be a problem for the President if he has already de­cided not to go for a presidential form of government.” Tikka de­cided to see the President himself and had a long meeting with him on August 14. He later told me that the President had agreed to nominate Jatoi as the caretaker Prime Minister. Iqbal said Jatoi was very happy when he told him about the President’s decision. Tikka told me that he had also informed Gen. Hameed Gul, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence, about his meeting with the President. But the entire political landscape changed completely with the sudden dis­appearance of the General from the scene after the crash of his plane near Bahawalpur on August 17.

PPP’s Gang of Four. Muslim League was not alone in having internal strife. PPP was having its own bout. By early 1988, there ap­peared to be a shift in its political fortunes in the Punjab. The elec­tions to the local bodies and then unopposed election of the Muslim League candidates from the Punjab to the Senate built up the image of Nawaz Sharif and his party. The atmosphere of the country was also different, with practically no restrictions on political activity and no restraints on the press. Most of those, who had left the coun­try due to martial law, were back and were resuming a normal life. The bitterness of flogging and jailing appeared to be a matter of the past. The defiance, which had been the hallmark of PPP, was giving way to normal politics of power, offices and elections. The defeat in the local bodies elections and the lack of any cause for agitation had thrown it off balance. There was despon­dency and infighting within the party, leading to drift and lack of direction. There was even some talk of internal differences and the emergence of groups in the party.
The newspapers carried stories of “the Gang of Four,” who had serious differences on policy issues with the party leadership. Malik Waris was working with Rao Rashid and they had their office in the Shah Jamal Col­ony. I went to see Waris there. He told me that Rao Rashid, Mian Ihsan, Afzal Sandhu and Malik Meraj Khalid were fed up with the PPP. Rao Rashid himself was in a bad shape. Waris wanted me to talk to Nawaz Sharif and bring the four stalwarts closer to the Government. I did not like to do that and discouraged him. I had al­ready spoken against such wheeling and dealing when the Mus­lim League wanted to win over the PPP council­ors after the local bod­ies elections. Waris repeated his proposal again and again for months. Afzal Sandhu and Mian Ihsan also talked to me and sug­gested that Rao Rashid should join the Government as a minister and they would all join the Muslim League. They were confident that Malik Meraj Khalid would also follow them.
The proposition and their insistence were quite tempting to the Gov­ern­ment but I was averse to it, nor was it my rightful function. Waris took up the matter with Haji Akram also but he too had the same view. In fact, Waris lost his temper with Haji Sahib for not helping him in the matter. On the persistent insistence of Waris, I met Rao Rashid at a dinner at the home of Waris. Rao had serious differences on some basic policy matters with Be­nazir Bhutto and wanted to see Nawaz Sharif. I told Rao that he had spent a very long time in politi­cal struggle as a PPP member and all that would be lost overnight. In fact, I persuaded him to think more before taking that kind of a major decision. He insisted that I should help him in getting an inter­view with Mian Sahib and then it was up to him to play politics or not. He had been my boss as IGP Punjab and I held him in high regard for his hon­esty and integrity. So, on his insistence, I talked to Mian Sahib. Nawaz Sharif in­vited Rao Rashid for a breakfast meeting. Waris took Rao to the residence of Mian Sahib. I did not like to be even around. The two met for two hours. Rao Rashid told me later that he was very impressed by Mian Sahib, found him “a very genuine person” and would like to work for him.
They did not meet again for some time. Rao asked me to arrange an­other meeting with Mian Sahib along with Mian Ihsan and Afzal Sandhu. On their insistence, I did it. (Meraj Khalid never warmed up to the idea, at least to my knowledge.) Mian Sahib wanted to induct Rao as his minister but they wished that he should join as a federal minister. (The Assemblies had already been dissolved and interim governments were working in the center and the provinces.) On Au­gust 17, 1988, Nawaz Sharif went by the first available morning flight to Rawalpindi to discuss the proposition with Gen. Zia but he had al­ready left on his fateful tour to Bahawalpur. Mian Sahib went over to Mur­ree and decided to take it up on the President’s return from Baha­walpur. But that was not to happen. Destiny had different designs. The President’s plane crashed. Suddenly everything changed. Rao Rashid went to Karachi and took charge of the central election office of the PPP, probably forgetting his serious dif­ferences with Benazir. A curtain of si­lence was drawn im­mediately on his earlier plans.
Ironically, the very much same Rao Rashid later became Estab­lishment Advisor to Benazir and charged me of indulging in politics! He even issued press statements to that effect against me. He also is­sued orders for my transfer from the Punjab to the Center and then suspension from service with the ultimate objective of my dismissal. He obviously suf­fered from hidden fears that his betrayal of PPP might be ex­posed by me but such a thing was abso­lutely against my grain. I never spoke on what I knew about his somer­saults and suffered the long and painful period of my absolutely unjustified sus­pension silently, patiently and with grace.