26

Thwarting trouble in Muharram
The country was back to normal political activity towards the end of 1986 as indicated by the infighting within both the ruling party and the PPP. The political process was bringing back the estranged people into the national main­stream. The struggle for sharing power within the rules of the game rules can save the people from adopting extreme positions. That is a blessing of the political process.
The ethnic divide in Sindh between Muhajirs and Sindhis, promoted by the vested interests, would continue as it had seeped down to the grassroots. The further sub-division in Karachi, between the Muhajirs on one side and the Punjabis and the Pakhtoons on the other, would also take its toll. How­ever, bridges of understanding and rapprochement were being built. “Divide and Rule” was slowly giving way to “Unite and Serve.” For me personally, it was satisfying to see the healing touch of a growing democratic process since I had suggested, in my summary for Gen. Zia, that the moderates in Sindh should be encour­aged before it was too late.

But human beings, pugnacious as they are, do find causes for dis­turb­ing public peace. Due to the Iran-Iraq war and the Islamization zeal of Zia, the Shia-Sunni conflict had intensified. The Muharram processions of 1986 were, therefore, likely to be troublesome, according to our intelligence agen­cies. The Special Branch updated assessments about the places where the route problems and prayer timings could cause trouble, and prepared the lists of known trouble-makers of both sects. Complete information was compiled for the first time for all districts and the thick volumes were circulated to all con­cerned for preventive measures well in time. The Home Depart­ment, under the dynamic leadership of Haji Akram, had alerted all Commis­sioners and District Magistrates. He also asked them for presentations on the admin­istrative arrangements for the Ashura, the 10th day of the Muhar­ram al-Haram, first month of the Muslim calendar, when Imam Husain and his companions were martyred at Karbala, Iraq, 14 centuries ago.
I prepared a strategy paper, suggesting, besides adminis­trative ar­rangements, the active participation in public forums of people’s representa­tives (MNAs, MPAs), the councilors of local bodies, the community elders and the activist ulema of all sects. These were to be called Ittehad bain al-Mus­limeen (Unity among Muslims) Councils and were to be formed at all levels in the province, from division, district, tehsil down to even town. I also suggested that all likely trouble-makers should be involved in the ar­rangements and made responsible for keeping peace so that they developed a stake in peace and not in trouble. Generally, it was an ego problem for them, aris­ing out of petty local irritations that sparked off trouble. Why not handle the trouble where it started?
Another suggestion was that a provincial minister should be made in­charge of every district to effectively coordinate between the administrative machinery and the various sections of the society. To make the administra­tion effective, the support of the people, through their elected representa­tives, should also be obtained. Therefore, the MNAs and MPAs should be involved in the maintenance of law and order under the guidance of the min­ister incharge.
The Chief Minister, in a cabinet meeting, approved the strategy pro­posed by me and assigned a minister to every district. He himself presided over the Ittehad bain al-Muslimeen Provincial Council, which had represen­tative leading ulema of all sects. He decided that the peace committee for every majlis or tazia procession should be present on the spot and move with the procession to intervene and resolve any issue that arose. He arranged for their transport and other logistical needs. The army was alerted wherever a serious threat to sectarian peace was likely. Such elaborate arrangements had never been made before as nobody had studied the problem in that de­tail. I had the benefit of my experience and had been keeping an eye on the prob­lem since 1979 and had drawn up a plan to meet the likely problems.
The large funds from Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia going to their respec­tive protégés on sectarian grounds strengthened them but were not meant to create trouble. There were, however, other powerful forces within and with­out the country, which wanted to wreck the democratic set-up in the very first year of the lifting of martial law. During the martial law period, there had been sectarian clashes every year in the Northern Areas, Parachanar, Dera Ismail Khan, Bhakkar Jhang, Karachi and other places but in 1986 the anti-Pakistan and anti-democratic forces wanted to create specially serious trou­bles during Ashura. Luckily, I had the latest information on their plans. In my view, the best way to fight them back was with the support and power of the people. I exposed the conspiracy of the anti-Pakistan forces by taking the cabinet, the Ittehad bain al-Muslimeen Councils and the entire admini­stra­tion into confidence. The enemy made its arrangements and so did we.

There was serious trouble near the Railway Washing Lines mosque in Lahore on 10th of Muharram, at an unusual time (early morning) when no­body expected it. Some unidentified strangers attacked the imam and others praying behind him and ran away within minutes. The flame had been ig­nited by provoking the majority Sunni sect. The peace committee and the administration faced the up­hill task of defusing the situation. Then, some­body secretly and stealthily set on fire a Sunni-managed imam bargah in Mughalpura. The trouble soon spread. Within minutes, clashes took place at Nabipur Shian and Lal Pul nearby.
Rana Maqbool Ahmad, SSP Lahore, a very effective and bold police officer, personally intervened to control the situation. The miscre­ants at­tacked him directly. He lost two teeth and had to be rushed to the hospital, unconscious. The attackers were aware that with Rana Maqbool around, they could not achieve their nefarious objectives. So they successfully ren­dered the Lahore Police leaderless. The miscreants would create trouble at one place, disappear as if into thin air and then reappear suddenly some­where else. The administration and police geared up further and all police reserves were rushed to the troubled areas.
The miscreants had selected the new areas for trouble to divert attention and resources from the main tazia procession, which was being guarded on its route within the Walled City mainly with the help of volunteers from citi­zens. If the miscreants knew that, in fact, only a small force was accompa­nying the main procession due to emergencies elsewhere, things would have easily gone out of control. The trouble ignited in the outside areas was con­tained by the use of massive police force. In the evening, the usual pinpricks and stoning by a group of Haq Char Yar outside the Bhati Gate took place, like every year, and then the main procession entered peacefully Karbala Gamay Shah, the final destination, well in time. Everybody heaved a sigh of relief.
But it was too soon to stand down. After the main procession had ended peacefully, somebody fired towards the Darbar Data Ganj Bakhsh from the dark backside of Karbala Gamay Shah, killing two innocent per­sons. The killer or killers escaped unnoticed. The Shias were suspected as the firing had come from the side of the Karbala. The word of attack by Shias on Data Darbar spread like wild fire through the loudspeakers of the mosques of Lahore. Data Darbar is held in the highest esteem by the La­horis and soon the whole city was in the throes of convulsions and hysteria. On the other side, Shias were giving frantic calls. Some Shia families shifted to safer places as their houses were being attacked by crowds in various mu­hallas.
Meanwhile, the police mobile units were moving with highest speed and efficiency. The peace committees were made more active during the night with the help of MNAs, MPAs and Lahore Metropolitan Corporation coun­cilors. Shehzad Hasan, DC Lahore, did a great job in mobilizing all of them and they, along with the administration, were able to contain the trouble and protect citizens from their own madness.

Intriguing scenario. To me the scenario appeared very strange. The Shias and Brelvis go very well with each other while the Deobandis and Shias remain at logger­heads. And Shias held Data Darbar as sacred as Brelvis. It was, therefore, obvious that a third party was involved. The pat­tern of the morning inci­dents also pointed in the same direction.
Haji Akram was worried that the political setup was under a serious threat as a large-scale law and order breakdown was always held against the civil administration. Therefore, the public order had to be maintained at all costs, including the imposition of curfew.
Half of Lahore, east of the Mall, was placed under curfew. Haji Sahib strongly held the view that the police should enforce the curfew, without calling in the army, to save the political government from the accu­sation that it had failed to maintain law and order. But the IGP S.D. Jamy considered the police insufficient to enforce the curfew and the army was called in. The army carried out a flag march and camped at vital positions. The actual enforcement on the ground was carried out by the police or by the peace committees.
The next day the army proposed that the whole of the city should be un­der curfew. The Chief Minister called a meeting to discuss the issue. The Home Secretary spoke against the proposal as the supply position of essen­tial items had already deteriorated. The fresh vegetables, milk, fruit, fish and many other food items were becoming scarce.
A very senior officer said, “Let the buggers suffer. They will know the value of peace only then.”
Haji Akram said, “The ordinary citizen is not the trouble-maker. The trouble-makers have eluded us. They might have even crossed over the bor­der. Why torture our own people? We should also not give an impression that Lahore is under siege and the situation has further deteriorated. In­stead, we should give the impression that normalcy was returning. Let us instead reduce the area under curfew and also regulate the supplies rather gener­ously.”
The Chief Minister agreed with Haji Sahib against the advice of so many other officers in the meeting. Lahore was normal in three days. If the curfew had been extended on that day, it might have taken a month to nor­malize the situation. And there would have been a trail of grievances of the citizens and accumulated hatred towards the government.

Gen. Zia-ul-Haq came to Lahore immediately after the Shia-Sunni trouble. The President came to 7 Club Road for the briefing. Saeed Mehdi, Commissioner, Lahore, gave him the details of the incidents, starting with a reference to a provocative sectarian speech by the well-known religious scholar, Dr Israr Ahmad. He also mentioned similar speeches of other Sunni religious leaders. The General directed that tough action should be taken immedi­ately against all of them.
The presentation had become one-sided and the consequent action was likely to cause trouble. So, I took up the briefing and told the President that there was the other side to the coin also. The conflict was the result of speeches and actions on both sides but that was normal in such cases. On the fateful day, the Shias at the Washing Lines mosque ostensibly caused the first incident. The firing at Data Darbar in the evening apparently also came from the Shia side. But the incidents indicated a pattern of pre­meditated and well-planned acts of trained saboteurs. Now, if action was to be taken only against the Sunni ulema, the trouble would increase because the majority sect would have a very serious grouse. I recommended that even-handed and fair action should be taken after an impartial inquiry. I also rec­ommended a dialogue between the leaders of the two sects. Gover­nor Makhdoom Sajjad Husain Qureshi supported my views quite enthusiasti­cally. The DC Lahore was then asked to act in the light of facts. If I had not intervened in time, one-sided action would have been taken, causing further trouble between the two sects.

Junejo suspects conspiracies. Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Junejo came to Lahore and asked for a briefing on the Shia-Sunni clash. He was displeased on the briefing to the President and took it as interference in the executive authority of the Prime Minister by the President. I gave him an hour-long briefing on the origins and pattern of the disturbances on the Ashura, along with an histori­cal perspective. He asked me many probing questions. He suspected that the unprecedented disturbances were a conspir­acy to destabilize his demo­cratic government and he wanted severe action against the Lahore admini­stration.
“May be, sir,” I said. “A conspiracy is not ruled out but similar or even worse Shia-Sunni disturbances have taken place earlier. In 1963, when my own father-in-law, Mian Muhammad Shafi, was DC Lahore, much worse riots took place in this very city. The same year claimed more that 200 lives during Shia-Sunni trouble in the small town of Khairpur in Sindh. The issue is basically sentimental and people suffer temporary insanity in matters of creed. The enemies of the country created trouble and then exploited the situation. It needs to be faced with courage and equanimity. Your admini­stration acted promptly and wisely in the given circumstances.”

After hearing me, the Prime Minister appeared relaxed but I sensed a widening gap between him and the President. He was also suspecting that Nawaz Sharif was tilting towards the General. My friend, Salman Farooqui, then working as Additional Secretary to the Prime Minister, told me that Junejo suspected Haji Akram and me to be siding with Nawaz Sharif.
“I am just doing my duty with Mian Sahib,” I told Farooqui. “What does the Prime Minister expect of me? Does he want me not to do my duty? It is rather strange, to say the least.” I was deeply hurt.
“Don’t feel it,” he reassured me. “You are a friend. I told you so that you remain careful. That’s all.”

I could see that Haji Akram and I were caught in crossfire of jeal­ousies and intrigues. The palace intrigues were targeting us just because we were doing our duty honestly and correctly. We could escape it if we lay low and followed a policy of drift. But a conscientious person just cannot do that. I have seen many shrewd and experienced officers, who act hypocriti­cally and do nothing to improve a deteriorating situation, only to save them­selves from any possible criticism later.
Haji Sahib and I had acted honourably and honestly during the moves against Nawaz Sharif within his party and also during the Shia-Sunni clashes, without bothering who was playing what game against whom. We tried to do our duty towards the government with the best of out abilities. We did not want the democratic set-up to be weakened as that would not have been in the best interest of the country. We handled the 1986 MRD move­ment differently than was done in 1983. Our handling was firm, fair and successful without any bitterness while the ruthless and thoughtless ap­proach in 1983 had created a plethora of insoluble problems. The Shia-Sunni clash was handled intelligently, with even-handed fairness and sagac­ity.
We were working on sensitive and important positions in the Punjab with Nawaz Sharif, who treaded his path carefully but firmly and with the dignity of a gentleman. The infighting within the Muslim League was not allowed by him to cross the limits of decency. The troika of the President, the Prime Minister and Pir Pagara had its own subtle problems. We ren­dered our advice and analysis to the Chief Minister honestly and sincerely whenever and wherever required, in accordance with the rules and practices of the services.
Dr Safdar Mahmood, who was also under a cloud, attracted the ire and jealousies of his adversaries by his outstanding intellectual attainments. They resented his mature advice to Nawaz Sharif to add to his friends, not ene­mies. Such thinking obviously goes against the wishes of petty minds, who always wish to fish in troubled waters.
Those who were out to demolish Nawaz Sharif and could not succeed, were now taking out their frustration on the three of us by accusing us of be­ing political activists. In fact, we always advised Mian Sahib against admin­istrative so­lutions of political issues. We saved him from the usual tempta­tion of false criminal cases against adversaries, adopted by most of the pre­vious rulers to their own ultimate disaster. We always made a moral and healthy contribution by restraining him from the misuse of police. He him­self had a pious bent of mind and we simply tried to encourage him.