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Feudals conspire against Nawaz Sharif
The believers in the effectiveness of brute force interpreted the decency and fairness of Nawaz Sharif as a sign of his weak grip on the administra­tion. The feudal elite believed that a young man with a business and indus­trial background, lacked the mettle to rule a predominantly agricul­tural province. They wished for a feudal lord from among themselves to be its ruler, riding on horse back with a whip in his hand. By the middle of 1986, Pir Pagara was making damag­ing statements against him. Malik Allahyar Khunda, Sardar Nasrulla Khan Dreshak, Mian Asif, Abida Husain, Mian Salahuddin, Ahmad Saeed Kir­mani, Makhdoom Hasan Mahmood, Yusuf Raza Gilani and others of the old guard were openly active against him.
The hostile posture of Pir Pagara was interpreted as an indication of op­position also from Muhammad Khan Junejo, the Prime Minister and Presi­dent of the Muslim League, as he was a devoted disciple of Pir Pagara. The dis­sidents were creating an impression that the Prime Minister was disowning Nawaz Sharif. They were also spreading the word that he had nei­ther political roots nor his own group within the Muslim League and was thus unable to have any hold on the members of the Punjab Assembly. The Assembly itself was a motley crowd of disparate individuals, having been elected on their own strength in a non-party election. They were not bound by any party discipline, which is acquired by ideological zeal or sufferings in a common struggle, something the Muslim League no longer had.
Nawaz Sharif, quite generous by nature, did favours to the MPAs and MNAs as far as possible, including allotment of residential and commercial plots out of his discretionary quota, the choicest postings and transfers to their rela­tives in the public service and appointments of their near and dear ones to prestigious jobs after freely relaxing the prescribed rules. He was thus be­coming quite popular with them. This made the old power brokers still more averse to him. They tried to hit him below the belt by accusations of cor­ruption and womanizing. He was a handsome young man and they would, therefore, link all types of female celebrities with him. The perni­cious propaganda had little effect, however.

The power struggle was actually a kind of class war. The feudals and landlords have been sharing power with the rulers for centuries. Land had been the only source of revenue and the soldiers and the landlords acted as in­termediaries between the kings and the peasants. The pattern continued during the British raj also and even after Independence. The emergence of industry and business in recent years and the migration of rural popula­tion to cities created a new phenomenon. By representing it, Nawaz Sharif was be­coming a rival force in his own right. Some landlord politicians told me that if he succeeded, the way would be open to others and the feudal hold on power would become shaky. Therefore, they had to overthrow him before it was too late. And they did try.

Betting on Pervez Elahi. In July 1986, Malik Waris, retired SP, brought informa­tion that Ch. Pervez Elahi, Punjab Minister for Local Bod­ies, was being en­couraged to jump into the arena as a candidate to replace Nawaz Sharif. Waris had learnt it from Ch. Tajammal Husain, an MNA and a very close relative of Ch. Pervez Elahi. Ch. Shuja’at Husain, son of Ch. Zahoor Elahi and a cousin and brother-in-law of Ch. Pervez Elahi, was then a federal minister. Zahoor Elahi family was considered to be very strong politi­cally in the Punjab. Ch. Pervez was being egged on by Pir Pagara, who was the pir of Junejo, the president of the ruling party. All other rivals and feu­dals were likely to line up behind Ch. Pervez, according to their calculations.
The political scenario was really formidable. Nawaz Sharif looked like an innocent dove about to be pounced upon by hungry hawks, with their sharpened claws. I, as head of the Special Branch, informed Haji Akram, Home Secretary, of the developments. He was worried that such intrigues would be harmful to the delicate democratic setup, which had been just re­vived. He suggested that I should inform the Chief Minister about the likely desertion of Pervez Elahi, to be followed by Makhdoom Altaf Ahmad, Fi­nance Minister, and then others.
“Should I not verify the information further, determine the extent of conspiracy and only then inform him?” I asked.
“Yes, that would be better but you have to be quick before it is too late,” he said.
My other sources verified the information already available with us. Haji Akram got the same confirmation through his own independent sources.
I prepared an analysis of the political groupings in every district and the likely alignments if open conflict took place between the two sides. Well-in­formed meant well-armed. It is always better to anticipate and fore­stall in­stead of reacting to a development. I prepared charts to describe groups and relationships of MPAs and MNAs of the Punjab.
In all districts there were opposing feudal and political families, who had always been at loggerheads. My study indicated that Mian Sahib was the only leader who could keep such diverse elements together in a practically non-party house without any ideological cohesion. Ch. Pervez Elahi could, at the most, carry with him one group from every district, or half of the total MPAs. The other group would inevitably oppose him in view of its political rivalry. Thus Nawaz Sharif, a new entrant in politics without any previous align­ment, would be able to carry with him the maximum number of MPAs.

Zia sits on the fence. Mian Sahib was initially reluctant to believe that Ch. Pervez Elahi was involved in wheeling and dealing against him when Haji Akram and I gave him our information. He was, however, already aware of some moves against him through his political sources and was tak­ing counter measures to consolidate his position. He thanked us for the timely informa­tion and analysis and directed us to keep an eye on the situa­tion.
Haji Akram advised the Chief Minister to get the open support of Gen. Zia but I kept quite. On our way back, I told Haji Sahib that Gen. Zia was keeping his options open. He would not move prematurely as he was play­ing a very subtle game. He had to keep Punjab Chief Minister as a counter­weight to the Prime Minister. He would come out with his open support for whoever ultimately appears certain to have the majority in the Punjab As­sembly. I was aware of it through Ch. Ghulam Husain, of Siasi Log, Rae Saeed, MPA, and the apparent conduct of Dr Basharat Elahi, brother-in-law of the General.
“Why didn’t you give this information also to Mian Sahib?” he asked.
“No way,” I said. “He may lose his nerve. Let him win politically. In the process, he will be able to build up his confidence and stand on his own feet. Moreover, giving my assessment of the President’s attitude now will be overstepping my brief and also risky.” Haji Sahib agreed.

After a few days, Ch. Pervez Elahi came out openly with his bid for power. He met me in the Assembly chambers and took me aside. “Why are you standing with Nawaz Sharif so openly and firmly?” he asked. “It is a matter of days before he falls. Everybody is with me and nobody will stand with him. Brig. Qayyum is coming from Abbottabad to support me. Why are you sticking your neck out?”
“Because he is the Chief Minister,” I replied. “It is my duty to keep him informed. I am just doing my job. I am not exceeding my charter of duties nor am I taking sides. Anyway, I don’t think Mian Sahib will lose. Why are you spoiling your good relations with him?” I did not mince my words.
He did not like it and said, “Haji Akram, Dr Safdar Mahmood and you are the only three officers who think that he can survive.”
“May be so, but that is how I perceive the situation.” I made a straight­forward statement. I had to be candid with him.
Brig. Qayyum did arrive from Abbottabad and stayed with Sabah-ud-Din Jamy, IGP. He tried to work out a compromise between Ch. Pervez Elahi and Nawaz Sharif but did not succeed.
There was a state of uncertainty, with a lot of propaganda and disin­formation from both sides. Each side was trying to show its strength by giv­ing breakfasts, lunches or dinners but many of the MPAs enjoyed the hospi­tality of both. A feeling was emerging that Ch. Pervez Elahi was likely to carry the day as he had a political background and was supported by power­ful lobbies but I stuck to my assessment.
In October 1986, the Assembly session was called for normal business. If the Assembly was prorogued without displaying the confidence of the majority in the government, the dissidents would exploit the state of uncertainty to the hilt. The non-democratic forces were watching the de­vel­opment gleefully and the apprehensions of Haji Akram about the damage to the nascent democracy were not misplaced.

Vote of confidence. Haji Akram and I discussed the situation with Dr Safdar Mahmood. He proposed that Nawaz Sharif should take a vote of confidence on the last day of the session to remove the feeling of uncer­tainty and to put an end to moves against him. Dr Safdar Mahmood dis­cussed the idea with the younger brother of the Chief Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, who did not warm up and was afraid that it might turn out to be counter-productive.
We were, however, convinced that a vote of confidence was the only way out. Otherwise, the MPAs might be misled by propaganda and in­trigues when they were not together at on place. We talked to the Chief Minister. I gave my analysis in writing, pointing out that at the most 18 MPAs of his party were likely to vote against him in a house of 260. So, he had nothing to fear.
The Chief Minister, after a very sentimental speech in the house on Oc­tober 23, asked for a vote of confidence. All Muslim League MPAs present in the house, except five, expressed their support with a loud ap­plause and a standing ovation. He had won the confidence of the house and secured his political future.

Nawaz Sharif used his influence and administration to consolidate his position. He used the development funds to please the MPAs, accommo­dated them in postings and transfers and obliged them in many other ways but refrained from using the police for coercion. Thus, he was able to avoid the disaster that Bhutto had brought on himself by following the advice of some sinister and evil-minded police officers. Haji Akram was right when he advised him to avoid that kind of influence. Truth, not tricks is the only sure way to success.

Gen. Zia, during a visit to Lahore a week after the vote of confidence, came out strongly in favour of Nawaz Sharif by saying that “his anchor was strong.” (His actual words were: Nawaz Sharif ka killa mazboot hai.) He wanted to show that Nawaz Sharif had the strong backing of the General. He also conveyed in a subtle manner that Pir Pagara and Muhammad Khan Junejo had failed to oust Nawaz Sharif.
While the General was congratulating the Chief Minister, Haji Akram looked towards me in a meaningful glance, with a twinkle in his eyes. Only we knew the real depth of the conspiracy against Nawaz Sharif and how he was brought out of it. Perhaps Mian Sahib’s nobility and sincerity ulti­mately saved the day for him. No wonder, he even became friends again with Ch. Pervez Elahi within no time as if nothing had happened!